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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1994, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State

Laws promulgated the long awaited, completely revised Uniform Adoption
Act (UAA).' Many aspects of the UAA generated widespread and heated
*
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(1970); J.D., University of Michigan (1974). I wish to thank a number of people for their
assistance in the preparation of this article. First, several faculty colleagues provided valuable
feedback on an earlier draft Professor David Herring (Pittsburgh), Professor Joan Hollinger (UC
Berkeley), and ProfessorRhonda Wasserman (Pittsburgh). Second, three University ofPittsburgh
School of Law students provided helpful research assistance: Richard DiFrischia ('98), Michelle
Reed Oppenheimer ('98), and Stacie Wagner Patterson ('98). Finally, I am indebted to LuAnn
Driscoll and the other staff members in her office who helped me with the technical aspects of
preparing the manuscript.
1. UNIF. ADOPnON ACT, 9 U.L.A. 1-94 (Supp. 1998).
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discussion during the drafting process,2 and the debate continues now as the
Act is being reviewed by policymakers and legislators in the state capitols
In these settings, no subject addressed by the UAA has been more
controversial than the subject of open adoption.
As used here, the term open adoption refers to the creation of
enforceable post-adoption visitation rights for certain individuals, especially
the birth parents ofthe adopted child, through the entry of a visitation order
by the adoption court.' Currently, the adoption statutes in all but a few
states make no provision whatsoever for such open adoption decrees.' In
the process of drafting the UAA, the commissioners considered a proposal
to permit open adoption orders in cases where the adoptive parents agreed
to the arrangement.' This proposal encountered vehement opposition and
was not included in the final draft. 7 As finally promulgated, the UAA
authorizes enforceable open adoption orders only in the limited category of
stepparent adoptions.' Section 4-113 of the UAA authorizes the judicial
creation and enforcement of post-adoption visitation rights for the former
parent, as well as certain other persons, based on a determination of the
2. See Joan H. Hollinger, The Uniform Adoption Act: Reporter'sRuminations, 30 FAM.
L.Q. 345, 347-49 (1996).
3. According to the Family LawReporter, bills proposing the enactment of the UAA were
introduced into six state legislatures during the first year after its approval. See 21 Fam. L. Rep.
(BNA) 1328, 1328 (1995). Legislative interest continues; a bill was introduced in the
Pennsylvania Legislature in February of 1997. See S.544, 18 1st Leg. (Pa. 1997).
4. Defined most broadly, the term open adoption contemplates other exceptions to the
traditional model of the confidential, closed adoption besides the visitation option discussed
herein; thus, adoption arrangements that simply permit the adopting family to have information
about the birth family are frequently referred to as open adoptions. See, e.g., Marianne Berry,
Risks and Benefits of Open Adoption, 3 THE FuuRE OF CHILDREN: ADOPTION, Spring 1993, at
125-26 ("Open adoption refers to the sharing of information and/or contacts between the adoptive
and biological parents of an adopted child, before and/or after the placement of the child, and
perhaps continuing for the life of the child."). Article four ofthe UAA, which authorizes visitation
rights for birth parents and other persons, is the reference point for the definition of open adoption
employed in this essay. See art. 4 cmt., 9 U.L.A. at 68-69.
5. The following state statutes expressly authorize the adoption court to enter post-adoption
visitation orders for certain individuals, including the former parents, or to recognize private
visitation agreements in certain specified situations: ALAKASTAT. § 25.23.130(c) (Michie 1995);
CAL.FAM. CODE § 8714.7 (West Supp. 1998); IND.CODEANN. § 31-19-16-1 (Michie 1997); Mo.
REV. STAT. § 453.080.2 (West 1998); NEB. REV.STAT. §§ 43-162 to -164 (1993 & Supp. 1996);
NEV.REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 125A.330.1,127.171 (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1997); N.M. STAT.ANN.
§ 32A-5-35 (Michie 1995);N.Y. Soc. SERV.LAW § 383-c (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1997); OFHo
REV. CODEANN. § 3107.62,63,65 (Anderson 1996 & Supp. 1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.305(2)
(1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-6-17 (Michie Supp. 1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-121(0
(1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 4-112 (Supp. 1997); W. VA. CODE § 484-12 (1997); WASH.
REV. CODEANN. § 26.33.295 (West 1997); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.925 (West 1997).
6. See Hollinger, supranote 2, at 372-77.
7. See id.
8. See id.
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adopted stepchild's best interests. 9
In the typical stepparent adoption, a child who has been residing for a
period of time with his or her custodial biological parent and a stepparent
(the custodial parent's spouse) is thereafter adopted by the stepparent.'

9. UAA § 4-113 provides for the creation and enforcement of post-adoption visitation
orders in stepparent adoptions, whether or not the parties have agreed to the arrangement, as
follows:
(a) Upon the request of the petitioner in a proceeding for adoption ofa minor
stepchild, the court shall review a written agreement that permits another
individual to visit or communicate with the minor after the decree of adoption
becomes final, which must be signed by the individual, the petitioner, the
petitioner's spouse, the minor if 12 years of age or older, and, if an agency placed
the minor for adoption, an authorized employee of the agency.
(b) The court may enter an order approving the agreement only upon
determining that the agreement is in the best interest of the minor adoptee....

(c) In addition to any agreement approved pursuant to subsections (a) and (b),
the court may approve the continuation of an existing order or issue a new order
permitting the minor adoptee's former parent, grandparent, or sibling to visit or
communicate with the minor if
(2) the former parent, grandparent, or sibling requests that an
existing order be permitted to survive the decree of adoption or that a
new order be issued; and
(3) the court determines that the requested visitation or
communication is in the best interest of the minor.
(d) In making a determination under subsection (cX3), the court shall
consider the factors listed in subsection (b) and any objections to the requested
order by the adoptive stepparent and the stepparent's spouse.
(e) An order issued under this section may be enforced in a civil action only
if the court finds that enforcement is in the best interest of a minor adoptee.
(g) Failure to comply with the terms of an order approved under this section
or with any other agreement for visitation or communication is not a ground for
revoking, setting aside, or otherwise challenging the validity of a consent,
relinquishment, or adoption pertaining to a minor stepchild, and the validity of
the consent, relinquishment, and adoption is not affected by any later action to
enforce, modify, or set aside the order of agreement.
§ 4-113, 9 U.L.A. at 75-76.
10. Notably, article four ofthe UAA, entitled "Adoption ofMinor Stepchild by Stepparent,"
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Following the adoption, the custodial parent and the former stepparent
(now the adoptive parent) are the child's two legal parents for all
purposes." Under established principles of adoption law, the legal status of
the other biological parent must be terminated prior to a stepparent
adoption. 2 Termination can occur in one of two ways: either the
noncustodial parent agrees to give up his or her parental status, or the court
determines that the parent is unfit or that other statutory grounds exist to
terminate the parent-child relationship. 3 In this context, the open adoption
option provided by the UAA, which returns the (former) noncustodial
parent to the legal equation, has obvious significance for each of the parties
to a stepparent adoption, and for the legal system.
This Essay will analyze section 4-113 of the UAA to the extent that the
Act authorizes the judicial creation and enforcement of post-adoption
visitation rights for the former noncustodial parent following a stepparent
adoption. Part II of this Essay discusses the decision of the UAA's drafters
to limit the provision for open adoption to the stepfamily setting. As
described therein, strong policy reasons support the establishment of this
option for stepfamilies, and many of the same policies would support
extension of the open adoption provision to certain other categories of
adoption.
According to the drafters, one reason for introducing the open adoption
option in the stepfamily setting is to increase the number of stepparent
adoptions. Part III explores the manner in which the enactment of section
4-113 is likely to affect the various individuals and institutions whose views
on the desirability of stepparent adoption affect the results in particular
cases: the noncustodial parent, the custodial parent, the stepparent, the
stepchild, the trial court that rules on an adoption petition, and the
legislatures and courts that create the general standards for determining
when adoption petitions should be granted. The conclusion is reached that
is not limited to situations where the custodial parent is married to the adopting partner. The Act
authorizes adoption by the unmarried same-sex or opposite-sex partner of the custodial parent,
when the parent agrees to the adoption, the court approves on the basis of the child's best
interests, and the other requirements of the Act have been met. See § 4-102(b), 9 U.L.A. at 69.
During the past few years, a number of state courts have been asked to determine whether this
form of adoption is available when state statutes do not expressly provide for it. The various state
courts have reached inconsistent results. See Maxwell S. Peltz, Comment, Second-Parent
Adoption: OvercomingBarriersto Lesbian FamilyRights, 3 MIcH. J. GENDER & L. 175, 181-83
(1995) (advocating liberal construction of existing adoption statutes); Sonja Larsen, Annotation,
Adoption of Child by Same-Sex Partners,27 A.L.R. 5th 54 (1995 & Supp. 1998) (collecting
cases). The Uniform Adoption Act resolves the controversy by authorizing so-called "de facto
stepparent" adoptions. See § 4-102 cmt., 9 U.L.A. at 69.
11. See § 4-103, 9 U.L.A. at 70.
12. See 1 JoAN H. HOLuINGER, ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 2.10(3), 133.02(3)(b)
(1998).

13. See id. §§ 2.10(3), 4.04.
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the open adoption provision is likely to increase the number of stepparent
adoptions. The desirability of this result is premised on the fact that the
adoption courts enter adoption orders following scrutiny ofthe stepchild's
best interest in each case.
Part IV explores in depth the process by which the adoption courts are
likely to assess the petition for post-adoption visitation from the former
noncustodial parent in particular cases. The "best interests of the child,"
which is the controlling legal standard, has a special meaning here, defined
in part by a list of statutory factors in section 4-113." 4 Of special note, the
presence of a private agreement among the parties (the noncustodial parent,
the adopting stepparent, the custodial parent, and the child) is an influential
factor under this statutory scheme. 5 The existence of an agreement is
important primarily because it evidences the willingness of the private
parties to cooperate with each other in the future. In the event that such
cooperation breaks down, however, the question of enforcement of the
former parent's visitation rights will arise. Thus, Part V of this Essay
explores the issues raised by the summary statement in section 4-113 that
the noncustodial parent may seek future judicial enforcement of a poststepparent adoption visitation order in these circumstances.' 6 Although
questions of enforcement are troublesome, the underlying goal of
preserving designated family relationships outweighs these concerns in this
and in other child custody and visitation settings.
In summary, the model of open adoption for stepfamilies is a desirable
proposal for change in U.S. adoption law at the turn of the century.
Admittedly, section 4-113 raises complex policy issues as well as practical
questions about the implementation of the statutory proposal. In the end,
however, section 4-113 in all of its complexity is a well-conceived proposal
that responds to the needs of many modem families and the communities
in which they reside.
At this time, the general field of family law is a complex and turbulent
one. For many individuals in our society, the definition of family is more
fluid and flexible than in the past. The resulting demands on the system of
laws that govern family relationships are correspondingly greater. As
lawmakers, policymakers, and citizens review the existing legal structures
and various proposals for change in this historical context, a number of
common themes have emerged that assist in understanding and evaluating
them. The remainder of this introductory section delineates five of these
contemporary themes and describes the manner in which UAA section
4-113 highlights each one of them.
First, the subject of open adoption for stepfamilies raises the key
14. See § 4-113(b), 9 U.L.A. at 76.
15. See id. § 4-113(c).
16. See id. § 4-113(e).
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question whether the legal system should recognize and protect the
growing number of nontraditional families in our modem society. 7 The
inquiry must take account of both the benefits and the costs of creating
more complex legal family structures for individuals, the family unit, and
society. On the one hand, the goal of recognizing and protecting a child's
multiple family connections, such as the ties with both a noncustodial parent
and a stepparent, holds great appeal. On the other hand, the recognition of
multiple relationships in this manner may entail significant costs. Under
traditional adoption law, the courts generally close their doors to the parties
once an adoption is final, and the adoptive family thereafter enjoys the same
privacy and autonomy as other, traditional nuclear families. By way of
contrast, the creation and enforcement of visitation rights for the former
parent and others under UAA section 4-113 may result in the ongoing
involvement of the judicial system in the affairs of the adoptive stepfamily
for many years, thereby imposing added burdens on the family and the
courts. These important and competing considerations, which are brought
into conflict by the recognition of nontraditional family relationships under
section 4-113, are discussed throughout this Essay, especially in Parts II
and III.
The image of the open courtroom door raises a second important
question about post-adoption visitation by former parents. Namely, by what
means will judges enforce these newly recognized rights? Issues of
enforcement in the field of domestic relations are often problematic," and
no situation creates a greater quandary for the courts than visitation with
minor children. Specifically, how can a judge ensure that a noncustodial
adult will have meaningful access to a child over time if the custodial
parent(s) do not cooperate? While a significant body of law has developed
to answer this question in the contexts of grandparent visitation and post-

17. The subject of legal recognition for nontraditional families other than stepfamilies has

received considerable scholarly attention in recent years. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett,
RethinkingParenthoodas an ExclusiveStatus:The NeedforLegalAlternatives When the Premise
ofthe NuclearFamilyHas Failed,70 VA. L. REv.879 (1984); Karen Czapanskiy, Grandparents,
ParentsandGrandchildren:ActualizingInterdependencyin Law, 26 CoNN. L. REv. 1315 (1994);
Marc E. Elovitz, Reforming the Law to Respect Families Createdby Lesbian and Gay People, 3
J.L. & PoL'Y 431 (1995); Nancy D. Polikoff, This ChildDoes Have Two Mothers: Redefining
Parenthoodto Meet the Needs ofChildreninLesbian-MotherandOther
NontraditionalFamilies,
78 Gao. L.J. 459(1990); Mary C. Rudasill, GrandparentsRaising Grandchildren:Problemsand
Policy From an IllinoisPerspective, 3 ELDER L.J. 215 (1995); Rebecca L. Melton, Note, Legal
Rights of Unmarried Heterosexual and Homosexual Couples and Evolving Definitions of
"Family," 29 J.FAM. L. 497 (1991).
18. See, e.g., Carl E. Schneider, The Next Step: Definition,Generalization,and Theory in
AmericanFamilyLaw, 18 U.MICH. J.L. REFORM 1039,1047-48,1056(1985); Janelle T. Calhoun,
Comment, InterstateChildSupportEnforcementSystem:JuggernautofBureaucracy,46
MERCER

L. REv. 921, 932-46 (1995).
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divorce visitation by parents, 19 section 4-113 of the UAA is silent on the

question of enforcement remedies in the post-adoption setting. Therefore,
Part V of this Essay anticipates the forms that state involvement in the
otherwise private adoptive stepfamily might take in the event that the
former parent seeks to enforce a visitation order following the child's
adoption. The likely effects of judicial enforcement on the family are also
discussed.
A third issue of general significance in the field of family law raised by
section 4-113 centers around the statutory best interests of the child
standard, which typically confers wide discretion on judges to resolve
family matters. Not surprisingly, the UAA establishes "the best interest of
the child" as the standard to be used by the adoption court judge in
deciding whether to include visitation rights for the former parent in an
adoption decree.20 Similarly, the best interest of the child standard governs
all subsequent judicial decisions when the former parent returns to court to
enforce a post-adoption visitation order.2 ' Under this standard, which also
governs custody decisions in many other contexts, the judge may generally
consider any and all factors that he or she considers to be relevant to the
welfare of a particular child.'
The best interests of the child standard has been the focal point for a
more general discussion in family law circles about the wisdom of creating
rules that confer such wide discretion upon judges.' An alternative
approach involves the use of rules that are more clear-cut and easier to
apply. In the stepparent adoption setting, for example, the existing rules in
most jurisdictions absolutely disallow visitation orders for former parents.2 4
These rules are clear-cut, with the asserted benefit of certainty and
predictability of results in every case, and the additional benefit that little
judicial time will be required to reach the final result. Of course, the added
flexibility of a provision such as section 4-113 enables judges to consider
whether the denial of visitation would be the best result in each individual
case. Thus, as illustrated throughout this Essay and especially in Part IV,
section 4-113 of the UAA can be meaningfully evaluated against the
background of the basic debate about discretionary rules in the family law

19. See LINDAD.ELRoD, CHILDCUSTODYPRATICEANDPROCEDURES
20. § 4-113(b), (cX3), 9 U.L.A. at 76.

§§ 6:02,7:07 (1996).

21. Seeid. § 4-113(e).

22. See JoHN D. GREGORY

ET AL., UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW

371-72 (1993).

23. See, e.g., Carl E. SchneiderDiscretion,Rules andLaw: ChildCustody andthe 1MDA 's
Best-InterestStandard,89 MICH. L. REv. 2215 (1991). For more wide-ranging discussion of the

general tension in family law between the goals of fairness, certainty, and predictability, see Mary
Ann Glendon, FixedRules andDiscretionin ContemporaryFamilyLawandSuccession Law, 60
TUL. L. REv. 1165 (1986); Carl E. Schneider, The Tension Between Rules and Discretion in
FamilyLaw: A Report andReflection, 27 FAM. L.Q. 229 (1993).

24. See supranote 5 (collecting state statutes that permit visitation) and accompanying text.
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field.
The stepfamily's agreement to permit visitation by the (former)
noncustodial parent following a stepparent adoption plays an important role
in the judicial evaluation of open adoption petitions under the UAA. In this
regard, section 4-113 highlights the fourth major theme that is currently
discussed in the context of many other important family law doctrines. The
issue here is whether family members should be permitted to set their own
rules by private contract, and thereby supplant the otherwise applicable
family law doctrines that would govern their family.2"
Under the UAA, the existence of an open adoption agreement is not
determinative. The judge may refuse to approve the agreement of the
custodial parent and adoptive stepparent to allow visitation by the (former)
noncustodial parent based on the judge's view of the stepchild's best
interests." Conversely, the judge may include visitation rights for the
former parent in the adoption decree even though the adoptive family
opposes this result. Still, the existence (or lack) of a private agreement is
likely to be a very influential factor in most cases. As discussed in Part IV
of this Essay, the treatment of private agreements in this manner under
section 4-113 mirrors the modem trend toward qualified recognition of
private contracts in the wider field of family law.
A final theme highlighted by section 4-113 relates to the normative
function of family laws. The ultimate question here is whether lawmakers
can or should seek to enact laws that will encourage individuals to make
certain behavioral decisions about their families that they might not
otherwise make. If so, then what behavior is desirable, and what laws will
make people engage in such behavior?2" In the field of family law,
lawmakers frequently express viewpoints about what people "ought to be
doing" and shape rules of law with the purpose of getting them to do it.29
25. The issue of family contract enforceability arises in numerous settings, including
prenuptial contracts, divorce settlement agreements, and surrogate motherhood contracts. See Jana
B. Singer, The Privatizationof Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443, 1444-45 (documenting the
"preference for private over public ordering" that has emerged in various family law topic areas in
recent decades).
26. See § 4-113(b), 9 U.L.A. at 76.
27. See id. § 4-113(c).
28. See generally MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILYLAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY 176
(1993) ("[L]aw serves in part to help constitute a culture, which means that it not only reflects but
can shape the purposes that people pursue."); Gary B. Melton & Michael J. Saks, The Law as an
InstrumentofSocializationandSocialStructure, in THELAWAS ABEHAviORALINsTRUMENT235,

263 (Gary B. Melton ed., 1986) (evaluating "the law's success in stimulating or suppressing
particular behavior" across various fields of law).
29. This phenomenon can be clearly illustrated by various rules of law that have the stated
goal of encouraging eligible couples to marry. See generally Carl E. Schneider, The Channeling
Function in FamilyLaw, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495, 502 (1992) (describing how"family law...
set[s] a framework of rules, one of whose effects is to shape, sponsor, and sustain the model of
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In this vein, the drafters' comments to UAA section 4-113 state that an
important purpose of the open adoption law is to increase the number of
stepparent adoptions by providing an incentive to noncustodial parents to
consent to such procedures.30
The careful evaluation of such a provision must ask, first, whether the
stated goals are "good," and second, whether the legal incentives will
effectively achieve the stated goals. Part III of this Essay grapples with the
questions whether more stepparent adoptions is a desirable end, and
whether the provision of post-adoption visitation is likely to accomplish this
result. Analysis ofthe UAAfrom this perspective is not straightforward and
produces some surprising results. In the end, however, the normative
assumptions that underlie the UAA's open adoption provision appear to be
largely valid.
The evaluation of section 4-113 against the backdrop of the various
themes that currently dominate the field of family law reaffirms the value of
this model statutory provision. Section 4-113 of the UAA effectively
extends the recognition and protection of the family law system to an
important category of nontraditional families. The unadopted stepchild,
who resides with his or her custodial parent and stepparent and
simultaneously maintains a relationship with the noncustodial parent, has a
more complex family life than the child who is raised in a traditional nuclear
family. The UAA provides a model of stepparent adoption whereby the
complex reality of the stepchild's life is reflected in the governing rules of
law. Within this proposed statutory framework, the emphasis on private
decision-making is ultimately a wise method of empowering the family. Of
course, no adoption can take place and no visitation rights for the former
custodial parent can be established without the order of the court following
careful judicial scrutiny of the individual family. This burden is a fair one to
impose on the courts, in light of the benefits to be derived for stepchildren
from such a case-by-case assessment. Finally, concerns about
noncompliance by the parties and the need for judicial enforcement of
visitation orders for the former parent do not outweigh the benefits of the

marriage."). For example, certain courts have denied legal and economic rights to unmarried
cohabiting heterosexual couples in order to discourage such relationships and instead encourage
1979) (stating that
marital relationships. See, e.g., Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1210 (Ill.
Illinois public policy disfavors private contractual alternatives to marriage). A similar promarriage policy finds expression in many of the rules that severely limit stepparent responsibility

for child support. Here, the courts and legislatures have typically expressed the concern that the
financial burden of stepchild support obligations might discourage eligible individuals from
deciding to marry the custodial parents of minor children. See MARGARET M. MAHONEY,
STEPFAxmiLS AND THE LAW 13-14 (1994); Robert J. Levy, Rights and Responsibilitiesfor
ExtendedFanilyMenbers?,27 FAM. L.Q. 191,210 (1993); MargaretM. Mahoney, Supportand
CustodyAspects of the Stepparent-ChildRelationship,70 CORNELL L. REv. 38, 45 (1984).
30. See art. 4 cmt., 9 U.L.A. at 68-69.
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open adoption model for stepfamilies. Hopefully, potential problems can be
contained if the professionals involved in the adoption process provide
counseling at the time of adoption, and if mediation or counseling services
remain available to the family members thereafter. Where conflicts over
visitation nevertheless arise, the involvement of the judicial system is an
appropriate method for enforcing private rights and public interests, as in
other family law contexts. In summary, the post-adoption visitation
provision for former parents in the UAA is a model provision that should
be considered and enacted by the state legislatures.
I. STEPPARENT ADOPTION AS THE PREFERRED
SETTING FOR OPENNESS

Currently, the adoption laws in most states do not authorize the entry
of a visitation order by the adoption court for the former parent(s) of an
adopted child. 3 ' Thus, when the drafters of the UAA discussed the subject
of open adoption, they were contemplating an important change to the
adoption laws in most states. Following their extensive debates about the
subject of open adoption, the drafters provided for post-adoption visitation
in stepparent adoptions, but not in other adoption settings. 2 This Part
explores the reasons for, and validity of, this significant limitation on the
open adoption provision of the UAA.
The drafters' discussions about open adoption took place against the
backdrop of an ongoing nationwide debate; much has been written in recent
years about this subject, from the perspectives of both law and the social
sciences.33 There is no consensus among the experts in these fields about
the wisdom of changing traditional state adoption laws to permit ongoing
involvement by the biological parents with their adopted child. The experts
disagree about the impact of this and other aspects of the open adoption

31. See supra note 5 (collecting state statutes that authorize visitation orders) and
accompanying text.
32. See Hollinger, supra note 2, at 372 n.84. According to Professor Hollinger, in nonstepparent adoptions under the UAA, "[b]irth parents and adoptive parents may decide for
themselves how much contact to have and how much identifying information to share with each
other." Id. For example, birth and adoptive parents may agree to release identifying information
to each other, and "there is no bar to... agreements for post-adoption contact or visitation." Id.
Notably, however, the UAA takes a neutral stance on the enforcement of such arrangements in
non-stepparent cases, leaving the question to other provisions of law in the enacting states. See
§ 1-105 cmt., 9 U.L.A. at 9 ("Except in an adoption by a stepparent, the Act terminates any
previous order for visitation or communication with an adoptee but leaves to other law of the State
whether agreements for post-adoption visitation or communication are enforceable in a separate
civil action.").
33. See AnnetteRuthAppell, TheMove TowardLegallySanctionedCooperativeAdoption:
CanItSurvive the Uniform Adoption Act?, 30 FAm. L.Q. 483, 488-500 (1996) (citing numerous

books and articles about the subject of open adoption).
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model for each member of the so-called adoption triad: the adopted child,
the adoptive parents, and the biological parents. Proponents see many
benefits in establishing a more honest and open set of relationships for
adopted children, or at least in making such a model available to the parties
in individual adoption cases. Opponents of open adoption maintain that
families are best served by a more traditional model, which regards
adoption as a fresh start for the child in a new family protected by legal
guarantees of privacy and autonomy. The many refinements of these
arguments have been set forth and catalogued elsewhere by scholars in the
field of adoption law and practice.34
The debate about open adoption has unfolded against a legal backdrop
which largely reflects the views of the opponents of the open adoption
model.3 5 Adoption in U.S. law is a creature of state statutes. During the
second half of the twentieth century, the dominant legislative model has
contemplated the adopted child's complete removal from his or her
biological family and receipt of a new legal status as the child of the
adoptive parents for all purposes. For example, the Arizona adoption law
boldly states:
Upon entry of the decree of adoption, the relationship of
parent and child between the adopted person and the persons
who were his parents ... shall be completely severed....
[Furthermore], the relationship of parent and child and all the
legal rights, privileges, duties, obligations and other legal
consequences of the natural relationship of child and parent
shall thereafter exist between the adopted person and the
adoptive petitioner the same as though the child were born to
the adoptive petitioner in lawful wedlock.36
Among the numerous "consequences ofthe natural relationship" that are
lost to the biological parent under this type of provision are the parent's
custodial rights, including any legally enforceable right of future visitation
with the child. For example, in Kelly v. Blackwell,37 an appellate court in
34. See, e.g., Berry, supra note 4; Harriet E. Gross, Open Adoption: A Research-Based
LiteratureReview and NewData, 72 CILD WELFAR 269, 269-75 (1993).
35. In practice, open adoption is more widespread than the state of the law would suggest.
That is, the parties involved in adoption proceedings (the birth parents, adoptive parents, and the
agency or intermediary with whom they work) may enter into an informal agreement about future

visitation or other open practices, even in states that do not legally recognize such arrangements.
The parties' agreement may govern their future interaction as long as no disagreements

subsequently arise. An open adoption law is important, inter alia, because it provides legal
remedies in the event of such disagreements.
36. Apiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-117 (West 1989) (The sequence of statutory provisions has
been reversed in the text.).
37. 468 S.E.2d 400 (N.C. Ct App. 1996).
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North Carolina summarily dismissed the petition of a father who, after
consenting to his children's adoption, alleged subsequent sexual abuse by
the adoptive stepfather and neglect by the mother. According to the court,
the former father had no standing to raise these issues, or to seek visitation
or custody, because his parental rights had been terminated in the prior
adoption proceeding.3"
In addition to the substantive state law provisions that effectively delete
the biological family from the legal picture following adoption, numerous
procedural laws are designed to obliterate any record of the adopted child's
past. Thus, state statutes typically provide for confidentiality in the
adoption process, the sealing of all records in the matter, and the issuance
of a new birth certificate for the child listing the names of the adoptive
parents.'
The UAA largely retains the substantive and procedural aspects of this
traditional adoption model, but a major exception appears in article four,
which governs stepparent adoptions. First, under article four of the UAA,
certain procedural provisions relating to confidentiality are waived in
stepparent cases. For example, a provision requiring the adoptee's original
name to appear in the decree of adoption authorizes the use of a
pseudonym for this purpose except in adoptions by the child's stepparent.40
The apparent rationale for this exception is the practical impossibility of
hiding the identities of the parties (the noncustodial parent, the custodial
parent, the adoptive stepparent, and the child) from each other when the
child is adopted by a stepparent. In addition to such procedural provisions,
and more significantly, section 4-113 of the UAA authorizes enforceable
visitation orders for the former noncustodial parent or other persons when
the adopting adult is the child's stepparent.
Section 4-113 authorizes the adoption court to enter visitation orders
in two distinct situations, based on a determination of the best interests of
the adopted stepchild. First, the court may enter an enforceable order
approving the parties' written agreement, whenever the stepparent and
custodial parent have agreed to post-adoption visitation or communication
with the adoptee by any specified individual.4 ' Second, in the absence of
such an agreement, the court may enter an enforceable order allowing
communication or visitation by a former parent, grandparent, or sibling of
the adopted stepchild.42 According to Professor Joan Hollinger, the reporter
for the UAA, the consensus that emerged in support of this visitation

38. Id. at 401.
39. See 2 HOLLINGER, supra note 12, § 13.01(a), (b).

40. See § 3-705(aX1), 9 U.L.A. at 61. This section similarly withholds the option of using
a pseudonym in place of the child's name when the adopting person is the child's relative.
41. See § 4-113(a), (b), 9 U.L.A. at 75-76.
42. See § 4-113(c), 9 U.L.A. at 76.
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provision in the stepparent article marked a sharp departure from "the
deeply divided views of the [drafters] about post-adoption contact in
adoptions by nonrelatives."' The reasons for preferring stepfamily
adoptions for this purpose are not difficult to identify. 44
The traditional closed adoption model can be applied most readily in the
case of a newborn infant, who has no de facto ties with the birth family. The
goal of eliminating the biological family from the reality and the record of
the child's life may still be controversial in this context, but at least it can,
as a practical matter, be accomplished. Modem adoptions, however, most
often involve children in other circumstances. Besides the newborn child,
they include the child who has been a ward of the state and possibly in
foster care, and the child who has been residing with a relative or
stepparent who subsequently seeks to adopt. As to the older adoptees in
these additional categories, certain goals of the traditional adoption model,
such as secrecy and confidentiality, may simply not be achievable.
Furthermore, the strength of many of the policy arguments against open
adoption seem weaker when these types of adoption are under
consideration.
For example, in assessing the needs of adopted children, many
proponents of openness stress the child's need to be in touch with his or her
biological roots. 45 Conversely, many opponents emphasize the importance
of severing biological ties so that the child will not feel tom between two
families. 4' The weight of these competing child-related concerns may be
different in the case of a newborn, on the one hand, and an older child, on
the other. For the newborn child, the heritage interest primarily involves the

43. Hollinger, supra note 2, at 373. Still, the proposal to establish the open adoption option,
even in the limited context of stepparent adoption, is not without controversy. Thus, when the
North Carolina legislature enacted the stepparent adoption article of the UAA in 1995, all
references to post-adoption visitation orders under UAA section 4-113 were deleted from the state
statute. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 48-4-100 to -105 (1995 & Supp. 1996).
44. The special characteristics of the stepfamily for this purpose have been recognized by
scholars in the past who have made proposals for parental visitation following stepparent
adoption. See Brigitte U. Bodenheimer, New Trends and Requirements in Adoption Law and
Proposalsfor Legislative Change, 49 S.CAL.L. REV. 10, 49-51 (1975); Linda F. Smith,

Adoption-The CaseforMore Options, 1986 UTAH L. REv. 495, 547-57; Judy E. Nathan, Note,
Visitation After Adoption: In the Best Interests of the Child, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 633, 656-64
(1984); Susan F. Koffiman, CommentStepparentAdoption:AComparativeAnalysisofLaws and
Policiesin Englandand the UnitedStates, 7B.C.INT'L&COMP.L.REv. 469, 509-15 (1984). An
alternative model has been promulgated for legally recognizing the stepchild's ties to both
biological parents and the stepparent, involving creation of a new legal status for the stepparent
while preserving the full parental status of both biological parents. See Bodenheimer, supra,at
44-47; see also Koffinan, supra, at 502-09 (discussing formal, nonadoptive status available to
stepparents under English law).
45. See 2 HOLUNGER, supra note 12, §§ 8.04(1), 13.02(3Xb).
46. See id.
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child's future needs to know about his or her ancestry and to relate in some
way to biological family members. Post-adoption visitation is one of several
devices that may be used to accommodate these needs; others include the
sharing of information about the biological relatives through letters, phone
calls, or through a third party. By way of contrast, the pre-existing family
ties of the older adoptee, such as the child living in a stepfamily, may be
well-established at the time of adoption. Here, assessing the child's
perceived need "to be in touch with his or her biological roots" includes a
decision about how to deal with these established family relationships
following the child's adoption. Given the importance generally assigned to
the continuity of affectional relationships in children's lives, the heritage
argument is more likely to support direct contact, including visitation, in the
case of the older adoptee a7
Conversely, the argument that closed adoption properly prevents
children from experiencing conflicting loyalties to both the adoptive family
and the biological parents may be less compelling in many cases involving
older children, including stepchildren. As to the newborn infant, the closed
adoption model can, in fact, prevent the child from knowing his or her
biological family while being raised by adoptive parents. In this sense, the
child will not feel torn between the demands for loyalty from two sets of
parents whom he or she knows and cares for. As to the child who is older
when adopted, who has known his or her biological family prior to the
adoption, the legal system cannot simply erase the child's past or the
relationships that are already established. Admittedly, the legal system can
deny enforceable rights of access between the older child and the biological
family under the closed adoption model, in an effort to simplify the future
structure of the child's life and to avoid situations where the child will
experience inconsistent voices of parental authority. But such a law is not
likely to eliminate the loyalty that an older child already feels to the parents
he or she has known prior to adoption. In the stepparent adoption setting,
for example, if the child has established meaningful ties with the
noncustodial parent prior to adoption, the denial of post-adoption visitation
rights is not likely to eliminate the child's feelings for the former parent.
Thus, the goal of closed adoption relating to the creation of a single set of
family ties and loyalties seems less compelling here.

47. Not all adopted stepchildren have established relationships with their noncustodial
parents. For example, if the custodial mother was never married to the child's biological father,
and if her marriage to the stepfather occurred during the child's infancy, the stepfather may be the
only "father figure" the child has ever known. Indeed, a study of adoption in one Pennsylvania

county in the early 1980s revealed that a substantial portion ofthe stepchildren who were adopted
did not even know about their biological fathers. See Patricia A. Wolf & Emily Mast, Counseling
Issues in Adoptions by Stepparents, 32 SocIAL WoRK 69, 72 (1987). In such cases, the

establishment of post-adoption visitation rights for the noncustodial parent is an unlikely result.
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The fact that most stepchildren are older at the time oftheir adoption is
just one of several characteristics that make the category of stepfamilies a
likely candidate for open adoption.4" In many instances, a stepparent
adoption involves less disruption for the child than other adoptive
placements, because stepparent adoption serves to formalize the child's
already-existing family. Thus, adoption does not involve a new household
placement for the stepchild, who typically has been residing with the
custodial parent and stepparent prior to the adoption. Even a traditional
closed adoption does not entail the severance of all biological ties for the
stepchild, because the status of the custodial parent (who is married to the
stepparent) continues undisturbed. The concept of a "fresh start" is
arguably diluted by these other factors in the typical stepfamily adoption,
and the prospect of ongoing visitation by the second biological parent may,
therefore, be less disturbing.49
. The final feature of many stepparent adoptions that justifies
their
preferential treatment in this regard involves the status of the noncustodial
parent. The majority of modem stepfamilies are created following the
custodial parent's divorce from the noncustodial parent and subsequent
48. The unique characteristics of stepparent adoption are important for other purposes
besides assessing the open adoption issue. Thus, article four of the UAA includes special
provisions governing the adoption process that allow the court to waive general requirements
relating to the home evaluation and the accounting for expenses in stepparent adoption cases. See
§§ 4-111, 4-112, 9 U.L.A. at 74-75. Furthermore, the UAA reflects the likelihood of ongoing ties
between the adopted stepchild and the family of the noncustodial parent in the provision governing
the adopted child's inheritance rights. As a general rule under the UAA, all inheritance rights
between the adopted child and the birth family are completely severed, see § 1-105, 9 U.L.A. at
8-9, but an exception that adoption "does not affect the right of the adoptee to inheritance or
interstate succession through or from the adoptee's former parent," § 4-103(bX3), 9 U.L.A. at 70.
49. Ironically, the very stability inherent in the pre-adoptive stepfamily, which is created by
the marriage between the custodial parent and stepparent, has sometimes led adoption courts to
deny stepparent adoption petitions. Unlike many otherpotential adoptees, the unadopted stepchild
does not need an adoption order to create a secure family placement. Thus, stepparent adoption
petitions have sometimes been denied, based on the judge's view that the status quo of the
unadopted stepchild in the stepfamily household was "good enough." See In re J.A.A., 618 P.2d
742 (Colo. Ct. App. 1980) (denying stepfather adoption even though father's rights were
terminable based on his failure to contact child for three years);In re Hinton, 390 So. 2d 972 (La.
Ct. App. 1980) (denying stepfather adoption because best interests of children would be served
by receiving love from their stepfather and mother, with whom they resided, and also receiving
love from the father who had not seen them for two years); In reAdoption ofR.M.B., 645 S.W.2d
29 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (observing that the stepchild would continue to enjoy "the better part of
two worlds" by remaining unadopted); In re Gerald G.G., 403 N.Y.S.2d 57 (App. Div. 1978)
("Although we recognize that the child presently enjoys the trappings and benefits of a family unit
created by the natural mother and her spouse, it is also equally true that an order of adoption
cannot by itself contribute or add anything to the quality of this child's upbringing."). Under the
traditional state adoption statutes applied in these cases, the courts did not have the option of
ordering ongoing visitation between the stepchild and the noncustodial parent if the adoption

petition was granted.
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remarriage.5 " In this common fact pattern, the noncustodial parent (most
often the father)5 ' will have lost primary custody in the divorce proceeding,
and this fact is no indicator that the parent was unfit or uncaring. If the
noncustodial parent maintained a connection with the child following the
divorce and the custodial parent's subsequent remarriage, then he or she
may be a very appealing candidate for visitation rights under an open
adoption statute. Indeed, if the parent-child connection has been
maintained, the noncustodial parent probably retains the legal right to veto
any proposal by the stepparent to adopt. Thus, the UAA states that a
primary purpose for permitting post-adoption visitation is to encourage
more noncustodial parents to consent to stepparent adoptions in these
circumstances.5 "
While these various rationales may be offered to explain why the
drafters of the UAA limited the availability of post-adoption visitation
orders to the stepparent adoption setting, the decision remains a
controversial one. Many of these same rationales extend to other types of
adoption that also involve older children for whom adoption formalizes an
existing placement, such as children adopted by foster parents or by
relatives. In other words, the line drawn by the UAA to isolate the types of
adoption where the traditional closed model is still functional could have
been drawn more narrowly. One alternative would be to continue this
model only for the adoption of newborn children.
Indeed, among the current state statutes53 which authorize postadoption visitation rights for birth parents, several limit this option to cases
involving the adoption of older children. One state, Vermont, has enacted
the relevant provisions of the UAA, which only extend the open adoption
model to stepfamily adoptions.5 4 The other state laws are not modeled after
the UAA, but several are limited in other ways that restrict their application
to children who are not newborn infants at the time of adoption. Thus, the

50. See Marilyn hinger-Tailman & Kay Pasley, Divorce andRemarriagein the American
Family: A HistoricalReview, in REMARRIAGE AND STEPPARENTING 3, 11-13 (Kay Pasley &
Marilyn Ihinger-Tallman eds., 1987) (describing the formation of stepfamilies, and noting a

substantial decrease in recent years in the number of stepfamilies formed upon the remarriage of
a widowed parent and the simultaneous increase in the number of stepfamilies formed by the
marriage of a custodial parent who is divorced or never before married).
51. According to the U.S. Census Bureau in 1990,94% ofresidential stepparents were men.
See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS,
P23-180, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND REMARRIAGE IN THE 1990s (1992) [hereinafter CURRENT
POPULATION REPORTS], 10 (Table L).
52. See art. 4 cmt., 9 U.L.A. at 68-69. This matter is discussed at greater length later in the

next Part of this essay.
53. See supra note 5 (collecting open adoption statutes).
54. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 4-112 (Supp. 1997).
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Nebraska 5s and New York56 laws apply only to the adoption of children
who have been in foster care. Wisconsin and California come closest to the
UAA in this regard by making visitation orders available when the child is
adopted by a stepparent or by a relative.5 7 The remaining state statutes
appear to apply to all types of adoption, including adoption by a
stepparent.58
In the near future, additional states may consider the modification of
traditional adoption statutes to permit post-adoption visitation by former
parents. The UAA is an important model for such legislative action.
Lawmakers who remain unwilling to embrace open adoption as an option
for all types of adoption may be receptive to the more limited approach of
the UAA. As discussed in this section, the limitation of visitation rights for
former parents to the stepparent adoption setting is not unreasonable,
because many of the policy arguments that support open adoption have
special resonance in the context of the stepfamily.
The drafters of the UAA believed that the creation of enforceable
ongoing relationships between former noncustodial parents and adopted
stepchildren, in the discretion of the adoption judge, would be an
improvement to the traditional closed model of stepparent adoption."
Indeed, as discussed in this Part, there are numerous benefits in the open
model for the parties and for the communities in which they reside. An
additional rationale for including the post-adoption visitation provision for
former parents, set forth in the drafters' commentary, involves the desire to
increase the number of stepfamily adoptions.6' The following Part of this

55. See NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 43-162 to -164 (1993 & Supp. 1996).
56. See N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAw § 383-c (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1997).
57. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 8714.7(c) (West 1998); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.925 (West 1997).
58. A large number of states recognize post-adoption visitation rights for other relatives,
especially grandparents, but frequently limit grandparent visitation privileges to stepparent or
relative adoptions. See generally HOLLNGER, supra note 12, app. 1-A (describing the postadoption grandparent visitation laws in each state); Annotation, Grandparents'VisitationRights,
90 A.L.R. 3d 222 §§ 6, 9 (1979 & Supp. 1997). Grandparent visitation arrangements involve the
same conflicting interests that arise in any open adoption model. On the one hand, children may
benefit from a loving relationship with their grandparents; on the other hand, custodial and
adoptive parents should be free to rear their children without the intrusion of third parties who
come armed with court orders to guarantee access. See KoreenLabrecque, GrandparentVisitation
AfterStepparentAdoption, 6 CONN. PROB. L.J. 61, 79-80, 85 (1991); PatriciaA. Hintz, Comment,
Grandparents' Visitation Rights Following Adoption: Expanding TraditionalBoundaries in
Wisconsin, 1994 Wis. L. REv. 483, 507; Nathan, supra note 44, at 675. In the post-adoption
setting, grandparents have had greater success than parents in convincing legislatures and courts
to tilt the balance in their favor, in part because many lawmakers perceive the intrusion on the
adoptive family as less threatening when it comes from a grandparent. See, e.g., Miikon v. Ford,
332 A.2d 199, 204 (N.J. 1975).
59. See art. 4 cmt., 9 U.L.A. at 68-69.
60. See id.
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Essay explores the assumptions made by the drafters that the enactment of
UAA section 4-113 would result in more adoptions, and that such an
increase would be a positive change.
III. THE INCREASE IN STEPPARENT
ADOPTIONS UNDER THE UAA

The commentary accompanying the UAA states that open adoption was
included in the stepparent adoption article with the intention of increasing
the number of stepparent adoptions. The drafters believed that more
noncustodial parents would voluntarily consent to the adoption of their
children by stepparents if the law provided for enforceable post-adoption
visitation rights. Furthermore, the drafters expressed the view that the
resulting increase in the number ofstepparent adoptions would be a positive
change, because it "would give more children the advantage of living in a
household with two legal parents."'" As lawmakers now consider enacting
the UAA in their states, it is important to assess the assumptions the
drafters of the UAA made with respect to the open adoption provision of
the stepparent adoption article. Beyond this assessment of behavioral
incentives for the private parties, this Part also explores the likely impact of
section 4-113 on the courts and legislatures as they formulate adoption law
policies in the future. It is reasonable to predict that the recognition ofpostadoption visitation for former parents will produce liberalized legal
standards that could result in a larger number ofstepparent adoption orders
in contested adoption cases.
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, in 1990 there were
approximately 5.25 million stepfamilies, defined as married couples residing
with a minor child or children who is biologically related to one spouse but
not to the other.62 Stepfamilies are usually created in one of two ways.
First, the never-married custodial mother of minor children may marry a
man who is not the biological father. Second, the custodial mother or father
may remarry following the death of the other biological parent or following
a divorce from that individual. Given the high incidence of children born to
unmarried mothers and the high rate of divorce and remarriage in our
society, it is not surprising that the number of stepfamilies is large and
growing. 63
By comparison, the number ofstepparent adoptions in the United States
is relatively small. According to the commentary accompanying the UAA,
the total number of adoptions each year is around 130,000, and more than

61. Id.
62. CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, supranote 51, at 10 (Table L) (reporting 5,254,000
stepfamily households in 1990, which represented 21% of all married couple households).

63. See hinger-Tallman & Pasley, supra note 50, at 11-13.
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half involve minor children adopted by their stepparents or other relatives."
In light of the large number of stepfamily households, however, these
numbers indicate that adoption within stepfamilies is a relatively rare event.
No reasons are given in the UAA commentary for the drafters'
conclusion that an increase in the number of stepparent adoptions is an
appropriate goal for lawmakers. The likely reasons, however, easily come
to mind. The pre-adoptive stepfamily unit often resembles the traditional
nuclear family (defined as minor children residing with their two biological
married parents) in many ways. In the stepfamily, the two adults are
married to each other, and a biological and legal parent-child relationship
exists between the custodial parent and the child. The stepparent and child
share the same household, and both enjoy an important relationship with the
other adult who resides there. Over time, the stepparent-child relationship
may take on additional significance as the stepparent assumes more and
more responsibility for the child. When this happens, the stepfamily
members may wish to formalize their de facto family by establishing a
permanent adoptive parent-child relationship between the stepparent and
the child.
Beyond the private interests of the individual stepfamily members,
adoption in these circumstances may serve a perceived public interest as
well. Many policymakers continue to prefer the traditional nuclear family
format over other alternatives,65 and a stepparent adoption results in the
creation of a legal family that comes as close as possible to the nuclear
family. According to this viewpoint, the adoptive stepfamily household,
headed by a married couple who are the two legal parents of the child with
whom they reside, has the desirable qualities of certainty and stability within
a traditional family format.
For the stepfamily members, formalizing the stepparent-child
relationship may have both symbolic and practical significance. Frequently,
the stepchild assumes the same name as the adults in his or her household
at the time of adoption, and this change sends a symbolic message to the
world that the stepfamily is a "real family." For the stepchild in particular,
the commitment, certainty, and normalization of the family involved in a
stepparent adoption may have many positive effects on the child's
development and future well being.

64. See prefatory note, 9 U.L.A. at 2. Writers in the field of adoption law and practice have
criticized the dearth of statistical information that has resulted from the absence ofnational record
keeping in this field. See Hollinger, supra note 2, at 350 n.15; Kathy S. Stolley, Statistics on
Adoption in the United States, 3 THE FuTuRE OF CRi-DREN: ADOPTION 26, 26-27 (1993)
(describing the inadequate efforts of government agencies to keep track of adoption information).
Thus, the available data about the number of adoptions and the details about adoptive families are

not completely reliable.
65. See

GREGORY ET AL.,

supra note 22, § 1.02(a); Bartlett, supranote 17, at 880.
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On a more practical level, formalization of the stepfamily through
adoption involves a number of changes that are frequently beneficial for the
stepfamily members and the community in which they live. Even though the
stepparent may have assumed significant economic and custodial
responsibility for the child prior to adoption, there is little legal significance
to such a relationship. The legal relationship of the unadopted child and
stepparent is an uncertain affair, with no clearly defined rights and duties in
important areas such as child custody, surnames, child support, inheritance,
medical and educational decision-making, employee benefits, criminal law,
tort law, and tax law.' Upon adoption, however, the stepparent assumes
all of the same legal rights and duties, in these and other legal contexts, as
any other custodial parent. 67 Thereafter, third parties, such as doctors and
educators, know that both adults who reside with the child are equally
responsible for him or her.
There is, however, another side to stepparent adoption, which involves
the loss of the parental status of the noncustodial parent. Admittedly, there
are stepfamilies where the second biological parent is not a concern. The
parent may be dead, or his or her identity or location may be unknown.
However, these are not the families that the UAA seeks to affect through
the introduction of a post-adoption visitation provision. Rather, the
provision seeks to encourage adoption in families where the noncustodial
parent is present, by holding out the promise of future visitation in
exchange for the noncustodial parent's consent to adoption. 6' Especially
when the child has known this individual as a parent, the loss of parental
status may be emotionally wrenching for both of them.
In more practical terms, many important legal rights and duties are lost
when the status of the noncustodial parent comes to an end. Indeed, all that
is gained in terms of the stepparent-child relationship is, in the eyes of the
law, terminated as to the noncustodial parent.69 Thus, the adopted stepchild
loses rights to economic support from the parent for all time, and is no
longer a dependent of the parent for purposes of private and public
employee benefits. Like a number of existing state adoption statutes, the
UAA does retain one significant economic connection: the child remains the
heir of the noncustodial parent under state inheritance laws following a
stepparent adoption.70

66. See MAHONEY, supra note 29; David L. Chambers, Stepparents,BiologicParents,and
theLaw'sPerceptionsof"Fanily"AfterDivorce,in DIVORCE REFORM: ATTHE CROSSROADS 102,
108, 120 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990).
67. See, e.g., § 1-104, 9 U.L.A. at 8.
68. See art. 4 cmt., 9 U.L.A. at 68-69.
69. See, e.g., § 1-105, 9 U.L.A. at 8-9.
70. See § 4-103(bX3), 9 U.L.A. at70 ("An adoption by a stepparent does not affect... the

right of the adoptee or a descendant of the adoptee to inheritance or intestate succession through
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The adopted stepchild loses not only important economic ties to the
parent, but custodial ties as well. The former parent is no longer entitled,
for example, to have access to the child's medical or educational records.
Nor does he or she have standing to seek custody in the event that the
adoptive family is disrupted by death, divorce, or some other occurrence.
Of course, the UAA retains one significant custodial right: Under
section 4-113, the former parent may request an order of visitation based
on the best interests of the child.
Thus, in the category of stepfamilies where the noncustodial parent is
present, the effect of stepparent adoption is to substitute the stepparent for
the noncustodial parent as the child's second legal parent. Whether this
change is desirable and consistent with the child's welfare surely depends
upon the facts and circumstances of each individual case. One relevant
factor, which is highlighted by the notion that the adoptive stepparent is
replacing the natural parent in the eyes of the law, relates to the strength of
the stepparent's economic and emotional commitment to the stepchild.
In a number of reported cases, the adoptive stepparent's commitment
to the emotional and economic welfare of the adoptee has broken down at
a later time, when the marriage between the adoptive stepparent and the
custodial parent ended in divorce. 7 The possibility of divorce following a
stepparent adoption is statistically realistic, because the rate of divorce for
second marriages is even higher than for first marriages.72 In the reported
cases, each adoptive stepparent sought to set aside, or abrogate, an earlier
stepchild adoption when the marriage that created the stepfamily in the first
place came to an end." The stepparent may have believed that his or her
relationship with the child always remained contingent upon the underlying
marriage between the adults, especially if the stepchild was older when the
stepparent married the custodial parent.74
In the eyes of the law, however, the stepparent's status is permanently
or from the adoptee's former parent. .. ."). The UAA does not preserve this economic connection
when the child is adopted by an adult other than the stepparent. See generally2 HOLiNGER, supra

note 12, § 12.03 (discussing postadoption inheritance rights under various state laws in both the
biological family and the adoptive family).

71. See generally 2 HOLUNGER, supra note 12, § 8.02(3) (documenting that most reported
attempts by adoptive parents to set aside a final adoption fall into two categories: stepparent
adoption and adoption of children with special problems); Elizabeth N. Carroll, Abrogation of
Adoption byAdoptive Parents,19 FAM.L.Q. 155 (1985) (proposing for uniform state legislation

that would include a short time limitation for setting aside adoption orders).
72. See Lynn K. White & Alan Booth, The Qualityand StabilityofRemarriages: The Role
ofStepchildren, 50 Am.Soc. Rv. 689 (1985) (concluding that the presence of stepchildren is a
destabilizing factor within remarriages and contributes to a higher rate of divorce for remarried
couples).
73. See 2 HOLLiNGER, supranote 12, § 8.02(3)(b).
74. See JAMES D.ECKLERSTP-BY-STEPPARENTING 183-84 (1988) (excerpting interviews

with adoptive stepfathers whose marriages subsequently failed).
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changed to legal parenthood by an adoption order. Thus, actions to set
aside a stepparent adoption at the time of divorce rarely succeed, because
the applicable rules of law reflect a strong state interest in the finality of
adoption orders." As a general rule, the biological parent and the adoptive
stepparent stand on an equal footing at the time of divorce in terms of their
future economic and custodial rights and duties vis-a-vis the child.7
The permanent nature of the adoptive stepparent-child relationship,
embodied in these legal doctrines, should mirror the actual commitment of
the stepparent to assume the full status ofa legal parent. The UAA includes
certain procedures designed to make sure that the adoptive parent
understands this. Thus, the UAA requires the judge to include a statement
about the nature of the newly-created parent-child relationship in the final
adoption decree." The judge, lawyers, and other professionals involved in
the adoption proceeding can perform an important counseling function in
this regard. Often, stepparent adoptions proceed with less formality than
other types of adoptions, but formalities designed to inform the parties
about the nature of their post-adoption relationships are crucial.
Even when the stepparent is willing to assume the full responsibilities of
parenthood at the time of the adoption proceeding, and on a permanent
basis, the judge will grant the adoption petition only if it serves the child's
best interests. Besides the court's assessment of the strength of the
stepparent's commitment, additional considerations include the nature and
stability of the stepfamily, the economic and other costs of losing the legal
status of the second biological parent, and all other matters relating to the
child's welfare in each case. The behavior-shaping goal of the UAA, then,
is to increase the number of stepfamilies that initiate adoption petitions and
invite this type ofjudicial inquiry. The goal is wise and appropriate, in light
of all of the private and public interests involved in the matter of stepparent
adoption.
The second, related question remains to be answered: whether the open
adoption option provided by section 4-113 will in fact increase the number
of stepparent adoption petitions and the number of stepparent adoptions.
The decisions of several individuals must coalesce before an adoption can
take place: the decision ofthe stepparent to seek the adoption, the decision
75. See 2 HOLLINGER, supra note 12, § 8.02(3). But see In re Adoption of B.J.H., 564
N.W.2d 387 (Iowa 1997) (setting aside adoption of stepchildren and reinstating parental status
of their natural fathers where custodial mother fraudulently induced stepfather to adopt).
76. See, e.g., Bonwich v. Bonwich, 699 P.2d 760 (Utah 1985) (refusing to apply preference
for the biological parent in custody dispute during divorce proceeding between father and adoptive
stepmother).
77. See § 3-705(aX8), 9 U.L.A. at 66. The other adults who participate in the stepparent
adoption proceeding, the custodial parent and the noncustodial parent, must sign consent forms
that spell out in detail the specific ramifications of the adoption. See §§ 4-105, 4-106, 9 U.L.A.
at 71-72.
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of the custodial parent (and the child, if he or she has reached a certain age)
to support the adoption petition, the decision of the noncustodial parent to
consent to a termination of his or her status (in the absence of grounds for
involuntary termination), and the decision ofthe adoption court to grant the
petition based on the applicable legal standards. The impact of section
4-113 on each of these decisionmakers must be evaluated in order to
understand whether the visitation option will increase the number of
stepparent adoptions.
First, the drafters of article four of the UAA and others who have
analyzed the open adoption model have assumed that some noncustodial
parents will be more likely to consent to a proposed adoption if the
adoption order contains an enforceable provision about future visitation.7"
In cases where the parent is not unfit, and no other grounds exist to
involuntarily terminate his or her rights, voluntary consent is an absolute
prerequisite to adoption. Even in cases where the stepfamily can prove
unfitness, or other grounds for involuntarily waiving the parent's consent,
the prospect of doing so in a judicial proceeding may be so daunting that
they would not proceed with an adoption petition in the absence of consent
from the noncustodial parent. Thus, the voluntary participation of the
noncustodial parent is often crucial, and the UAA drafters hoped to
encourage such behavior by including the visitation provision. Althoughthe
matter is speculative, it does seem likely that certain noncustodial parents
will, in fact, be tempted by the availability of enforceable visitation rights
under section 4-113 coupled with the permanent termination of all future
financial
responsibility for the child under the general principles of adoption
79
law.

On the other hand, the well-informed noncustodial parent must realize
all of the other ramifications ofthe consent to terminate his or her parental
status, especially the loss of all rights as the child's custodian. As an
example, many noncustodial fathers have strong feelings about the
continued use of the father's last name, even after substantial contact with
the child has come to an end.8" Prior to adoption, the noncustodial parent
has no absolute right to insist that the child's name remain unchanged, but
the traditional legal standards in this field have nevertheless been slanted
78. See Appell, supra note 33, at 488 n.21 (citing numerous authorities who support the

proposition, not limited to the stepfamily setting, that parents are more likely to consent to
adoption if future visitation is assured).
79. The typical adoption order terminates future support duties, but does not eliminate any
child support arrearages owed by the parent whose rights are being terminated. See, e.g.,
§ 3-505(1), 9 U.L.A. at 58. The parties to a consensual adoption may agree to the forgiveness of

this obligation.
80. See Merle H. Weiner, "We are Family':"Valuing Associationalismin Disputes Over
Children'sSurnames,75 N.C. L. REV.1625, 1649-66 (1997) (discussing why men associate their

surnames with their identity).
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toward the preservation of paternal surnames."' Upon consenting to the
child's adoption, however, the former parent loses the legal right to
influence naming decisions, along with all other custodial prerogatives.
Surely some noncustodial parents, with varying degrees of involvement in
their children's lives, will find this scenario unacceptable, in spite of the
promise of future visitation under UAA section 4-113.
As discussed at length in Part V of this Essay, the UAA does not clearly
define the nature of the visitation rights established for the former parent
under section 4-113. These rights do not appear to be as substantial as the
well-defined rights of the noncustodial parent, whose legal status has not
been terminated, to visit with his or her child. It remains to be seen how
zealously the courts will enforce post-adoption visitation orders ifproblems
arise down the road, such as noncooperation by the adoptive stepfamily.
Under the UAA, such enforcement is by no means guaranteed. 2 In other
words, although the rights that the parent surrenders by consenting to a
stepparent adoption are clearly delineated, the nature of the new interest of
the former parent regarding future access to the adopted child is a much
less certain matter.
Ultimately, most noncustodial parents will base the important decision
about consent to a stepparent adoption on considerations of their own self
interests as well as their views about their children's best interests. In this
context, the legal right to have continued contact with the child will
predictably enable some, but not all, noncustodial parents to conclude that
adoption is in their best interests.
Besides the consent ofthe noncustodial parent, stepparent adoption also
requires the formal agreement of certain members of the stepfamily: the
stepparent, the custodial parent, and the child (if he or she has reached a
certain age). The views of the stepfamily members themselves about
adoption may well be influenced by the existence of an open adoption law.
To the extent that the custodial parent, stepparent, and child welcome and
value the child's association with the other biological parent, the current allor-nothing adoption model may seem inappropriate to them. A new model
that sanctions an ongoing legal tie with the former parent following
stepparent adoption may encourage such families to view adoption in a

81. See MAHONEY, supra note 29, at 149, 153-59 (describing the various legal standards
employed to resolve conflicts about stepchildren's surnames); Weiner, supra note 80, at
1690-1752 (same).
82. The UAA limits judicial assistance to those situations where "the court finds that
enforcement is in the best interest of a minor adoptee." § 4-113(e), 9 U.L.A. at 76. Furthermore,
the Act does not mention any specific enforcement mechanisms to aid the former parent. By way
of contrast, absent exceptional circumstances, parents who do not reside with their children and
whose rights have not been terminated have visitation rights that are enforceable through a variety
of legal mechanisms. See ELROD, supranote 19, at ch. 6.
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more positive light.
Special concern for the minor stepchild arises in this setting. Under the
UAA, the stepchild who is twelve years or older must consent to his or her
own adoption, 3 although the adoption court may waive this requirement
based on the nonconsenting child's best interests.84 Notably, when the
Vermont legislature recently enacted article four of the UAA, one of the
modifications made to the model act was the upward adjustment ofthe ageof-consent requirement from twelve to fourteen years.85 Certainly in some
families, where the older stepchild has established meaningful ties with the
noncustodial parent, giving consent to a stepparent adoption would be
experienced as a painful rejection of the parent, even if all of the adults
cooperate in the adoption proceeding. The child's concerns may be
somewhat allayed, and the child's consent may be more readily
forthcoming, if visitation is included in the formal adoption arrangement.
On the other hand, the introduction of a post-adoption visitation law
may turn stepparent adoption into a less attractive option for other
stepfamilies, who regard the noncustodial parent as an unwelcome intruder.
The stepparent or the custodial parent may decide that adoption is not
desirable if the effect would be to release the noncustodial parent from
economic responsibility while maintaining his or her right of access to the
child. Ofcourse, the UAA does not automatically provide for post-adoption
visitation by former parents in every stepparent adoption. Where the matter
is contested, one factor that the judge must consider is the objection of the
86
stepparent and custodial parent to visitation by the former parent.
Nevertheless, for families who view adoption as, among other things, a
method of getting rid of the noncustodial parent, the visitation provision is
likely to discourage, rather than encourage, stepparent adoption petitions.
Thus, while the commentary in the UAA focuses on the positive impact
that section 4-113 may have on the decisions ofnoncustodial parents about
stepparent adoption, state legislators considering its enactment should also
review other aspects of the private decisionmaking process. Some
noncustodial parents may, as the UAA commentary predicts, be influenced
to cooperate in an adoption proceeding because future visitation is
available. 7 Other noncustodial parents, however, will continue to find the
termination of their parental status to be an unacceptable option; for them,
a post-adoption visitation law would have no impact. Within the stepfamily,
the introduction of a post-adoption visitation law could influence private
decision-making in either direction, depending on the attitude and feelings

83. § 4-104, 9 U.L.A. at 71.
84.
85.
86.
87.

§ 2-402(bX2), 9 U.L.A. at 30.
See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 4-103 (Supp. 1996).
See § 4-113(d), 9 U.L.A. at 76.
See art. 4 cmt., 9 U.L.A. at 68-69.
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of the custodial parent, stepparent, and child about the proper role of the
noncustodial parent following a stepparent adoption.
Besides the private decisionmaking of family members, the introduction
of a post-adoption visitation law also may influence the decisions ofjudges
and legislators in ways that would predictably increase the number of
stepparent adoptions. In every adoption proceeding, the judge must decide
whether granting the adoption petition will serve the best interests of the
prospective adoptee. Furthermore, if a parent contests the petition, the
court must determine whether grounds exist to involuntarily terminate his
or her parental status, before the child's adoption can proceed. The legal
standards governing this latter decision vary among the states, ranging from
the strictest "parental unfitness" standard to the more liberal "best interests
of the child" standard.88 Trial judges exercise a great deal of discretion
when they apply the relevant standards to the facts of a contested adoption
case and decide whether to grant the adoption petition.89 Within this
framework, the enactment of a post-adoption visitation provision may
predictably influence judges to interpret the standards more liberally and to
grant more stepparent adoption petitions.
Professor Joan Hollinger has described the competing pressures that
influence the exercise ofjudicial discretion in contested stepparent adoption
cases:
Judicial interpretations of the statutory grounds for
forfeiting consent vary greatly. They seem to depend on how
solicitous the court is of the interests of the noncustodial
parent, or alternatively, ofthe child's interest in securing legal
recognition of what is already likely to be a stable custodial
household .
90
Within this framework, the additional possibility of accommodating the
interest of the noncustodial parent through a post-adoption visitation order
may encourage judges to grant more stepparent adoption petitions.
Of course, the matter is a speculative one, and the impact of the
statutory change proposed by UAA section 4-113 on judicial decisionmaking would be felt, if at all, in the limited number of cases that judges
regard as "close cases." In the contested adoption case where the
noncustodial parent has clearly been a fit and involved parent, the judge
must still dismiss the contested adoption petition based on the importance

88. See MAHoNEY, supra note 29, at 163-77 (discussing the various state standards for
terminating parental rights and their application in particular stepparent adoption cases); 1
HOLINGER, supra note 12, § 2.10[3][c].
89. 2 HOLLNGER, supranote 12, § 8.02(lXa).
90. Id. § 2.10[3][c], at2-99.
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of the biological parent-child relationship to both the child and the
noncustodial parent. Here, the statutory possibility of a post-adoption
visitation order for the noncustodial parent would predictably be irrelevant
to the judicial decisionmaking process. On the other hand, the
nonconsenting noncustodial parent who has consistently played a less
important role in the child's life presents the more difficult case for the
judge considering a contested stepparent adoption petition.
Under traditional law, the judge has an all-or-nothing choice to make:
order the adoption and totally eliminate the noncustodial parent from the
legal picture, or refuse to establish a legal bond between stepparent and
child thereby preserving the full legal status of both biological parents.
Within this framework, section 4-113 ofthe UAAwould add a third option.
In the category of close cases, where the merits of the proposed adoption
otherwise outweigh the merits of maintaining the status quo, the statutory
visitation provision may enable the court to address its protective concerns
about the noncustodial parent, while still proceeding with the adoption.
This result would be embodied in a judicial finding that the relevant
statutory standards for terminating parental rights and establishing a legal
relationship between stepparent and stepchild have been satisfied.
In this manner, the introduction of a visitation provision such as section
4-113 of the UAA may influence the construction and application of the
relevant statutory standards by trial judges in individual adoption cases.
Furthermore, the visitation provision also may influence state legislators
and appellate judges who revisit and reformulate the legal standards over
time. Predictably, these lawmakers may be more willing to "ease up" on the
general standards for terminating parental rights and proceeding with
stepparent adoptions, if they know that termination does not automatically
involve the complete severance of all legal ties between the noncustodial
parent and the adoptee.
In contested adoption cases, the interests of the nonconsenting
biological parent are important and constitutionally protected."

91. The Supreme Court has not fully defined the constitutional dimension of parental rights
in this context. The Court has reaffirmed the general proposition that parental rights are a
fundamental interest in the constitutional scheme, in cases involving evidentiary and procedural

issues when the state sued to terminate the rights of parents of neglected children. See Santosky
v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (invalidating "fair preponderance of the evidence" standard under
New York law because the Constitution requires, at a minimum, a "clear and convincing
evidence" standard in termination proceedings initiated by the state); M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct.

555 (1996) (holding that the state of Mississippi may not block an indigent mother's access to
appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the trial court based its termination
of her parental rights).
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has addressed the rights of unmarried fathers in the adoption

context on several occasions. As a matter of constitutional law, the father who serves an active
parenting role is entitled to the same protection as married parents. See HOMER H. CLARK, JR.,
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Traditionally, the legal system has protected the parent's interests in this
setting by allowing the parent to veto the proposed adoption unless he or
she has been an unfit parent. In recent years, however, a number of state
laws governing the waiver of parental consent to adoption have been
liberalized in order to better accommodate the private and public interests
that sometimes conflict with the parent's rights in this setting. Under these
statutes, the courts in specified types of adoption proceedings may consider
the interests of the child and the adoptive family, along with the fitness of
the noncustodial parent, in deciding whether to involuntarily terminate the
parent's legal status.92 For example, the following Massachusetts adoption
statute invokes a best interests of the child standard that clearly requires
judicial consideration of both the noncustodial parent-child relationship and
the child's existing custodial placement:
Whenever a petition for adoption is filed by a person
having the care or custody of a child, the [parent's] consent
...

shall not be required if... the court hearing the petition

finds that the allowance of the petition is in the best interests
of the child....
[T]he court shall consider the ability, capacity, [and]
fitness... of the child's parents .. and shall also consider the
...

ability, capacity, fitness and readiness of the petitioners.93

The rationale for liberalizing the legal standards in this manner appears
to be especially strong in the stepfamily adoption context. Professor Homer
Clark has expressed this opinion as follows:
A distinction should be made in [contested adoption] cases
between the child who has been taken from his natural parents
by a state.., agency ... and a child who has been ... living
with one natural parent and a stepparent. . . . In the...

[stepfamily] the child has very likely been integrated into a
new family on a permanent basis ....

In those circumstances

the courts should be much more ready to terminate parental
rights than in the foster care cases notwithstanding some

855-62 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing the
constitutional rights ofthe father ofillegitimate children); ElizabethBuchanan, The Constitutional
TiE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS INTHE UNrrED STATES

Rights ofUnwedFathersBeforeandAfter Lehr v. Robertson, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 313 (1984); Robert
S. Rausch, Note, Unwed Fathersand the Adoption Process,22 WM. &MARYL. REV. 85 (1980).
92. See generallyMAHONE, supra note 29, at 169-77 (describing the shift in the law away

from a strict parental unfitness standard for waiving parental consent to stepparent adoption).
93. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 3(a), (c) (West 1987 &Supp. 1997). This statute was
applied in a stepparent adoption case in Adoption ofa Minor, 389 N.E.2d 90, 91 (Mass. 1979).
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contact between the natural parent and the child.9 4
In a number of states, stepparent adoptions have already received the
special treatment proposed by Professor Clark, under statutes that permit
the court to waive parental consent more readily when the petitioner for
adoption is a stepparent.9" More state legislators and judges may be willing
to heed Professor Clark's advice, both in the formulation of legal standards
and their application to particular families, if some degree of protection for
the noncustodial parent-child relationship is available under a post-adoption
visitation statute.
The trend toward liberalizing the standards applied in stepparent
adoption cases is illustrated by the opinion of the Alaska Supreme Court in
In re J*J.J.," which affirmed a trial court's decision to grant an adoption
petition over the objection of the noncustodial father. The relevant state
statute provided that the adoption could proceed without the father's
consent if he had failed to support his child in the past. In JJJ, the Alaska
Supreme Court broadened its earlier construction of this statutory standard
in the following manner:
In this court's prior decisions . . . we have declined to
dispense with a noncustodial parent's right to withhold
consent to a stepparent adoption as long as the noncustodial
parent had made a few perfunctory communications or an
occasional gesture of support.
We take this opportunity to clarify that, in order for a
noncustodial parent to block a stepparent adoption, he or she
must have maintained meaningful contact with a child, and
must have provided regular payments of child support, unless
prevented from doing so by circumstances beyond the
noncustodial parent's control."
In JJJ., the court applied this "meaningful contact" standard to the
noncustodial father's conduct during the two-year period prior to the
stepparent adoption proceeding. During that time, almost all ofthe father's
support contributions had been made in response to collection efforts by a
state agency. Furthermore, a period of more than one year had elapsed
during which no communication with the child occurred. On these facts, the
state high court concluded that the adoption court had properly proceeded
with the stepparent adoption over the father's objection. Notably, in the
94. CLARK, supra note 91, at 900-01.
95. See 1 HOLUNGER, supra note 12, app. 1-A (collecting state statutes).
96. 718 P.2d 948 (Alaska 1986).

97. Id. at 952-53.
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same opinion, the Alaska Supreme Court recommended that the state
legislature consider the subject of "'incomplete adoption' [involving postadoption visitation for the former noncustodial parent] as a middle
approach ... that would allow the courts a more reasonable choice in
deciding stepfamily cases."9'
The dissenting justices in J.J.J.strongly disagreed with the majority's
decision to affirm the involuntary termination of the noncustodial father's
status.99 While suggesting that the request to legally formalize a stepfamily
through adoption presents a unique set of countervailing priorities, the
dissenting justices opined that the parent-child relationship must retain first
priority. Arguably, these same judges might have more readily accepted the
majority's interpretation ofthe state statute and joined in affirming the trial
court's stepparent adoption order in J.J.J.if the legal adoption framework
offered a new form of continuing protection for the noncustodial parent.
In summary, a post-adoption visitation law, such as the one proposed
for state enactment by the UAA, may well have the intended effect of
increasing the number of stepparent adoptions. Such a provision may
influence lawmakers to liberalize the legal standards that govern the waiver
of consent by the noncustodial parent, because visitation rights will provide
an alternative form of protection for the noncustodial parent-child
relationship. For the same reason, trial courts may more readily construe
established standards in favor of the stepparent adoption petition ifthey are
empowered to enter enforceable post-adoption visitation orders. Finally,
individual family members, especially noncustodial parents, may be
encouraged to voluntarily participate in more stepparent adoption
proceedings. In these various (and speculative) ways, the enactment of a
post-adoption visitation law may lead to an increase in the number of
stepparent adoptions, which has been appropriately embraced as a goal by
the drafters of the UAA.
IV. JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE ADOPTED STEPCHILD: THE SIGNIFICANCE
OF A VISITATION AGREEMENT

Section 4-113 of the UAA authorizes the entry of enforceable postadoption visitation orders in two distinct situations. First, subsection (b)
governs consensual cases where the custodial parent, the stepparent, and
the stepchild (if twelve years or older) have all agreed to the entry of a
post-adoption visitation order. The subsequent subsection contemplates the
alternative situation where there is no written agreement among the parties
about the future visitation requested by the former parent. Notably, while

98. Id. at 951.
99. See id. at 959 (Matthews, J., dissenting).
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the list of persons who may seek visitation under the consensual provision
of 4-113(b) is unlimited, the request for visitation in the absence of
stepfamily consent can be made only by the former parent, grandparent, or
sibling.
Not surprisingly, section 4-113 establishes "the best interest of the
minor adoptee" as the general standard to be applied to all requests for
visitation. The Act lists numerous factors that the court must consider,
along with "any other factor relevant to the best interest of the minor" in
each case. The specific statutory factors are:
(1) the preference of the minor, if the minor is mature
enough to express a preference;
(2) any special needs of the minor and how they would be
affected by performance of the agreement;
(3) the length and quality of any existing relationship
between the minor and the individual who would be entitled to
visit or communicate, and the likely effect on the minor of
allowing this relationship to continue;
(4) the specific terms of the agreement and the likelihood
that the parties to the agreement will cooperate in performing
its terms;
(5) the recommendation of the minor's guardian ad litem,
lawyer, social worker, or other counselor ..... '
One additional factor is added to the mandatory best interests of the child
analysis in cases where there is no agreement among the parties. Namely,
"the court shall consider.., any objections to the1requested
order by the
1
adoptive stepparent and the stepparent's spouse."''
The basic bifurcation of section 4-113 highlights the importance of a
written agreement among the parties in the judicial analysis of the child's
interests relating to post-adoption visitation. Absent such an agreement at
the time of the adoption proceeding, the likelihood of the parties'
cooperation in the future is called into question. This consideration raises
concerns about the specific statutory factor (number four, above) that
requires the court to weigh the probability of enforcement problems in the
future. If, at the time of adoption, the court can predict that the adoptive
family will not readily comply with a visitation order, it may reach the
conclusion that adoption coupled with visitation would not be in the child's
best interest. Many judges believe that extended fighting and litigation
between adults regarding the custody and visitation of a minor child is

100. § 4-113(bX1)-(5), 9 U.L.A. at 76.
101. Id. § 4-113(d).
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usually harmful to the child." 2 Section 4-113 of the UAA specifically
authorizes the judge to deny the visitation request of a former parent if this
concern is present in a particular case and is not outweighed by other
statutory factors.
Indeed, in the nascent body of state law on the subject ofopen adoption,
the existence of a contract has often been crucial. Among the existing state
statutes discussed earlier that authorize post-adoption visitation by former
parents in certain types of adoption, 0 3 the majority are restricted to
situations where the parties have a contract.' In addition, there is a small
body of case law dealing with open adoption issues in states that have not
yet enacted an open adoption statute. As a threshold matter, most courts
in these circumstances have simply refused to recognize or enforce any
visitation rights for former parents, regardless of whether the adoptive
parents agreed to such an arrangement.' But in the handful of cases where
courts have recognized and enforced open adoption arrangements, even
though the state adoption statute was silent on the subject, the presence of
a contract between the parties was often a critical factor." 6
For example, in Weinschel v. Strople,"7 the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals held that the visitation agreement in a stepparent adoption case
was enforceable as a private contract. The court found that the adoptive
family's interest in autonomy, which was protected under the adoption
statutes, had been waived by the custodial parent and adoptive stepparent
when they agreed to future visitation by the former noncustodial parent:
We read [the adoption statute which terminates all ties with
the biological family] as protective ofthe adoptive parents and
their status with the adopted child. It insulates the adoptive
parent and child from attack by a disruptive, displeased,
dissatisfied or disappointed natural parent .... The section,

102. See ELROD, supra note 19, §§ 17:01, 17:14.
103. See supra note 5 (collecting state open adoption statutes).
104. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 8714.7(a), (b) (West Supp. 1998); IND. CODEANN. § 31-19-162(4) (Michie 1996); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-35(A) (Michie 1995); OR. REV. STAT. §
109.305(2) (Supp. 1996); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.33.295(1) (West 1997); W. VA. CODE,

§ 48-4-12 (1997).
105. In the absence of an open adoption statute, most courts have refused to enforce a private

agreement about visitation under contract law principles, ruling that the terms of the contract are
contrary to public policy. The same public policy that prevents the adoption courts from entering
a visitation order under these circumstances, relating to the importance of a fresh start for the

adoptive family under state adoption statutes, also prevents any judicial enforcement of the
contract terms. See, e.g., In re Adoption of RDS, 787 P.2d 968, 970-71 (Wyo. 1990).
106. See Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, Postadoption Visitation by NaturalParent,78
A.L.R. 4th218, 230-45(1990 & Supp. 1996) (cataloging the reported cases based on the existence

or nonexistence of a contract).
107. 466 A.2d 1301 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1983).
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however, is a shield not a sword. It does not purport to
mandate that the adoptive parents and the natural parents may
not under any circumstance agree to visitation privileges by
the natural parents .... "
Under this theory, the court ruled that the former noncustodial mother in
Weinschel was entitled to assert a visitation claim.
This same point of view about the importance of a private agreement is
likely to carry weight under section 4-113(c) of the UAA and the existing
state statutes that authorize visitation orders even when no agreement exists
between the former parent and the adoptive family. Indeed, the
circumstances in which the adoption court would enter a visitation order
without the stepfamily's consent are probably quite limited. As a threshold
matter, such circumstances will almost always arise in cases where grounds
exist to involuntarily terminate the parent's legal status under the standards
established by state law for this purpose. Whenever such grounds do not
exist, the noncustodial parent will be in a position to veto the proposed
stepparent adoption. Therefore, the parent will have the leverage to make
the stepfamily's consent to future visitation a condition to the adoption
taking place. If visitation is important to the noncustodial parent, then he
or she would be unlikely to consent to the termination ofparental rights and
adoption by the stepparent unless the adoption decree includes a consensual
visitation order. By way of contrast, the noncustodial parent whose rights
can be involuntarily terminated by the court has no similar leverage. Here,
if the stepfamily is not amenable to a post-adoption visitation order for the
former parent, they need not consent to such an arrangement in order for
the adoption to go forward. If the noncustodial parent thereafter requests
a post-adoption visitation order, the adoption court must decide whether
to order visitation over the objection of the adoptive stepfamily.
It is possible to posit a hypothetical situation where the adoption court
would involuntarily terminate the parental rights ofthe noncustodial parent
who unsuccessfully contested a stepparent adoption petition, the adoptive
stepfamily would actively oppose the former parent's request for future
visitation, and the court would nevertheless determine that the child's
welfare required a post-adoption visitation order. Apart from the statutory
factors relating to the existence of a contract, all ofthe specific factors that
the adoption court must consider in a contested visitation case under
section 4-113 ofthe UAA relate to the welfare of the child. Specifically, the
court must consider the preference of the minor, his or her special needs,
the nature of the child's connection to the noncustodial parent, and any
recommendation from the child's formal representative. 9 In other words,
108. Id. at 1306.
109. See § 4-113(b), 9 U.L.A. at 76.
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the court may enter the visitation order over the objection of the custodial
parent and stepparent if other facts relating to the child's welfare point to
this result.
Such a hypothetical situation is more likely to arise in a jurisdiction
where the standard for involuntary termination of parental rights in
contested stepparent adoption cases is broad. As discussed earlier in Part
II, the relevant laws in certain states authorize the involuntary termination
of the noncustodial parent's status even if he or she has maintained some
forms of parental contact with the child. Specifically, certain state laws
authorize the termination of parental rights unless there was significant
communication and economic support in the past; others permit the court
10
to sever the parent's rights on the basis of the child's best interests.
Under these standards, involuntary termination may be lawful in some cases
where the child knows and continues to care about the parent, even though
their contact is not "significant" in the legal sense, and stronger family ties
have been established over time within the stepfamily. Under the UAA, the
adoption court may conclude that the child's interests in such a case will be
best served by granting both the contested adoption petition and the
contested request for visitation by the noncustodial parent."'
Just as the UAA contemplates the possibility of a post-adoption
visitation order in the absence of a written agreement, it also empowers the
adoption court to deny visitation even though all of the parties have agreed
to such an arrangement."' This result might be reached, for example, if the
judge believes that the custodial parent and stepparent have given their
consent to visitation only because they need the noncustodial parent's
consent to the adoption, and that they have no sincere intention of
complying with a visitation order. The future for the child under a visitation
order in these circumstances would likely follow one of two undesirable
courses. In the first scenario, the former noncustodial parent would be
deterred by the adoptive family's noncompliance with the visitation order
over time and thereafter end his or her relationship with the adopted child.
In the alternative, the former parent would be angered by the adoptive
parents' failure to honor their promise, and would involve the child in
future family fights in and out of the courtroom in order to maintain his or

110. See supranotes 88-99 and accompanying text (discussing state law standards governing
the involuntary termination of parental rights in stepparent adoption proceedings).
111. See generallyIn re Abraham, 385 N.Y.S.2d 103 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974) (granting both

stepfather's petition in adoption, which was contested by the noncustodial father, and visitation
for noncustodial father, which was opposed by the adoptive family).
112. See In re Adoption of G.T., 610 N.Y.S.2d 734 (Faro. Ct. 1994) (denying adoption

petition by great aunt, which contained agreement to permit visitation by mother who consented
to the adoption, where court believed that adoption would not serve child's interests because the
two adults did not intend petitioner to assume a true parental role vis-A-vis the child).
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her access to the child. Anticipating these alternative scenarios, the
adoption court may determine that the child's interests would be better
served by maintaining the status quo, thus denying the adoption petition.
The possibility of adoption without a visitation order for the former parent
is not an option in this hypothetical situation, because the parent's consent
is required before the adoption can go forward and will predictably be
withheld absent a visitation order.
Another situation where the adoption court may be leery of approving
the parties' agreement about stepparent adoption coupled with continuing
visitation rights for the noncustodial parent involves the stepparent who
does not fully grasp the significance of the role that he or she would be
assuming. As described at greater length in Part III, adoption is beneficial
to the stepchild, as a general rule, only if the adoptive stepparent's
commitment to the child is separate and distinct from his or her relationship
to the custodial parent." 3 Ifthe adoption court perceives that the stepparent
has not made the necessary emotional and economic commitment to the
child, then the court may determine that maintenance of the noncustodial
parent's legal status would better serve the child's interests. In these
circumstances, the stepparent adoption petition would be denied, even if all
of the parties agreed to the adoption and visitation provisions.
Although the UAA contemplates and provides for these exceptional
cases, it remains clear that the private agreement among the parties to a
stepparent adoption plays a very important role under section 4-113. In
recent years, the role of private contracts has assumed greater significance
in the general field of family law."' The agreement between stepfamily
members and the noncustodial parent regarding adoption of the stepchild
by the stepparent and visitation for the former parent, contemplated by
section 4-113, can be understood and evaluated as part of this larger
development.
Traditionally, family laws have defined and regulated family status
relationships, such as marriage and parent-child relationships, leaving little
room for individuals to vary the legal definition in particular cases. These
family laws were intended to provide clear and certain rules that guaranteed
protection for weaker family members in a manner that was fair to all. The
modern trend toward allowing the parties to vary the terms of state-defined
family relationships recognizes the important principle of contractual
autonomy for individual families at a time when society and de facto family
relationships are more varied than in the past. At the same time, however,
the courts and legislatures have been unwilling to confer total autonomy on
the parties to set aside the provisions of law that protect weak family

113. See supranotes 71-77 and accompanying text.
114. See Singer, supra note 25, at 1443, 1444-46.
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members and promote basic societal interests. As a result, the newlyrecognized contractual freedom in the family sphere is generally subject to
continuing limitations.' 5
The most widespread application of these changes has taken place in the
laws governing the marriage relationship." 6 State laws traditionally have
defined a unique and extensive list of legal consequences that constitute the
legal marriage status." 7 In recent years, marriage partners have sought
leeway to vary many of the economic and other legal consequences of this
state-imposed marriage contract. For example, the lawmakers in many
states have addressed the question whether antenuptial contracts, which
attempt to change the future economic rights and duties between the
spouses, are enforceable. The response of the state courts and legislatures
has not been uniform, as the important and competing policy concerns that
arise in this situation have been balanced differently in different
jurisdictions."'
In a similar fashion, section 4-113 ofthe UAA confers limited discretion
upon the parties to move away from the status relationships defined by
traditional adoption law by entering into a private agreement. As explored
at length earlier in Part II, the traditional model of stepparent adoption
requires the complete termination of the child's ties to the noncustodial
parent and his or her relatives." 9 Furthermore, the model establishes the
adoptive family as a completely independent and autonomous unit. The
open adoption option creates an exception to both of these aspects of the
traditional adoption model, and the existence ofthe parties' contract is very
influential in determining whether the option will be exercised in a particular
case.
Of course, the autonomy of the private parties under section 4-113 of
the UAA is not complete, because any contract between the noncustodial
parent and the stepfamily members about post-adoption visitation must be
approved by the adoption court based on a determination ofthe child's best
interests. Predictably, the courts will not simply rubber-stamp such

115. See id.

116. Similar questions about the contractual freedom of individuals have challenged
traditional notions about family law status in other settings as well, including separation
agreements at the time of divorce, and contracts between the parties who conceive children using
new reproductive practices. See id. at 1460, 1478-79.
117. See David L. Chambers, Whatlj? The Legal Consequences ofMarriageand the Legal
Needs ofLesbian and GayMale Couples, 95 MICH. L. R.nv. 447,452-84 (1996) (cataloging the
legal consequences of the marriage status).
118. See Gail Frommer Brod, PremaritalAgreements and GenderJustice, 6 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 229 (1994); Robert Roy, Annotation, Enforceability of PremaritalAgreements
GoverningSupportorPropertyRightsUpon DivorceorSeparationasAffected by Circumstances
SurroundingExecution-Modern Status, 53 A.L.R. 4th 85 (1988 & Supp. 1997).
119. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
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agreements, but will make their own careful assessment of the parties'
motivations and the child's needs. The reservation of judicial discretion in
this manner is consistent with the general approach taken by the courts
toward the acceptance of private contracts about family law issues. 20
As illustrated by the foregoing discussion, the open adoption option
under section 4-113 of the UAA adds to and complicates the work of the
adoption courts. Under the current laws in the large majority of
jurisdictions, the adoption court has no authority to enter an open adoption
order.' 2 ' Therefore, the judicial response to any request for post-adoption
visitation in these states must be an automatic "no." Of course, even in
states that subscribe to the traditional adoption model, the court has the
responsibility to determine whether the noncustodial parent's rights are
terminable and whether stepparent adoption would serve the future welfare
of the child. The open adoption option adds another inquiry to the court's
agenda: whether post-adoption visitation by the former parent would serve
the interests of the child in cases where the first two questions are answered
in the affirmative.
The additional exercise of judicial discretion in this manner under
section 4-113 is well designed to ascertain and facilitate the best interests
of many stepchildren and their families. The court in each case must
determine whether the child's interests will best be served by judicial action
that formalizes the stepparent-child relationship while maintaining a key
aspect ofthe child's legal connection with the noncustodial parent. In many
cases, this is the power to simultaneously recognize the stepchild's
relationships with the three adults who have served parenting roles, thereby
protecting an important category of nontraditional families.
V. THE STATUS OF THE FORMER PARENT UNDER A
POST-ADOPTION VISITATION ORDER:

ENFORCEMENT ISSUES
Section 4-113 of the UAA authorizes the adoption court to consider
requests for future visitation by the noncustodial parent of an adopted
stepchild. Absent such a law, every stepparent adoption order inevitably

120. Wheneverjudges are called upon to make decisions about the future custody of children,
they make their own independent determination about the most appropriate disposition. See
CLARK, supra note 91, at 786-89. In the common setting of divorce, for example, the spouses
frequently present the court with a separation agreement containing terms about the financial and
custody issues arising under state divorce law. As a general rule, the courts are more deferential
to the parties regarding the spousal support and property provisions of their contract than the child
support and custody-related provisions. See, e.g., UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DrvoRcE ACT § 306(f),
9A U.L.A. 216-17 (1987) (creating more lenient standard forjudicial acceptance ofprovisions of
the separation agreement that deal with issues affecting the spouses rather than the children).
121. See supranote 5 (collecting open adoption statutes).
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and permanently severs all legal ties between the adoptee and the
noncustodial parent." The post-adoption visitation order contemplated by
section 4-113 involves the construction of a new legal relationship between
the former noncustodial parent and the adopted child, following the
termination of their prior parent-child relationship. The final Part of this
Essay explores the nature ofthe new legal relationship established between
the former parent and adopted stepchild under these circumstances.
Notably, section 4-113 also provides for judicial enforcement of the
visitation rights for former parents established under the UAA, in the event
of noncompliance by the adoptive family."2 As discussed in the last Part,
the issue of future compliance is anticipated in the UAA standards that
govern the adoption court's initial decision about entering a visitation order
for the former parent.' Under section 4-113, one of the factors that the
court must consider in ruling on the noncustodial parent's request for
post-adoption visitation rights relates to the likelihood offfuture compliance
by all of the parties. 2 ' Nevertheless, compliance problems will surely arise
over time in some cases. Therefore, this final Part also investigates the
forms of state intervention into the adoptive stepfamily that may be used by
the courts if the parties fail to comply with the adoption court's visitation
order.
In defining the precise nature ofthe rights created for the former parent
under section 4-113 of the UAA, several helpful reference points exist in
well-established family law doctrines. First, the visitation rights of
noncustodial parents find clear definition and protection in the laws
governing family relationships following divorce.2 6 Second, a more recent
body of statutory and case law has defined the rights of so-called third
parties, who are nonparents for whom protectable rights of access to
children also may be established by court order. For example, in recent
years, every state legislature has conferred standing on grandparents to seek
visitation with their minor grandchildren under certain circumstances, which
are frequently limited to situations where the grandparent's child does not
have primary custody ofthe grandchildren. 2 7 Less common, but on the rise,
are legislative and judicial doctrines that confer similar rights upon other
third parties, including the siblings or former stepparent of the minor child,

122. See § 1-105, 9 U.L.A. at 8.
123. See § 4-113(e), 9 U.L.A. at 76.
124. See supraPart IV.
125. See § 4-113(b), 9 U.L.A. at 76.
126. See ELROD, supranote 19, ch. 6.
127. See Catherine Bostock, Does the Expansion of GrandparentVisitationRightsPromote
the Best Interests ofthe Child?: A Survey ofGrandparentVisitationLaws in the Fifty States, 27
COLUM. J.L. & SoC. PROBS. 319 (1994); Anne Marie Jackson, Comment, The Coming ofAge of
GrandparentVisitation Rights, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 563 (1994).
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or the former cohabitating partner of the child's custodial parent. 2
As a general rule, such third-party interests are less weighty in the eyes
ofthe law than the rights ofnoncustodial parents following divorce, and the
range of judicial tools available for their enforcement is more limited.
Significantly, the UAA refers to the parent for whom a visitation order may
be issued in the stepparent adoption proceeding as "the former parent,"
with the apparent intention of relegating him or her to the category of
"third-parties" vis-i-vis the child for this purpose. 129 However, the
designation still leaves a great deal of room for lawmakers to subsequently
determine the precise place ofthe former parent's interest in the scheme of
legally recognized family relationships.
The distinction drawn in existing family law doctrines between visitation
claims by parents and the corresponding claims of third parties has several
important ramifications. First, under the U.S. Constitution, every parent
whose legal status has not been terminated has a constitutionally protected
right to enjoy the company of his or her child. 30 This fundamental right
continues to receive legal protection, even when the parent and child do not
reside together. For example, a Kansas statute sets out the following
stringent standard for determining when the noncustodial parent is not
entitled to a visitation order: "A parent not granted custody or residency of
the child is entitled to reasonable visitation rights unless the court finds,
after a hearing, that visitation would endanger seriously the child's physical,
mental, moral or emotional health."'' Parental rights are further protected
by a strong presumption in the law that the continuation of legal ties with
both parents serves not just the parents' interests but the child's best
interests as well.' Prior to a stepparent adoption, the noncustodial parent
of the stepchild enjoys this protected parental status.
By way of contrast, third parties, including the former parent following
a stepparent adoption, have no constitutionally protected interest vis-A-vis
minor children. Even when state laws confer standing to seek visitation, the
requests ofnonparents are resolved strictly on the basis of the best interests
of the child. Indeed, the standard set forth in the UAA for deciding whether
to grant the former parent's request for visitation with an adopted stepchild
is "the best interest of the minor."'3 Here, there is no protectable right of
the adult to consider. The grandchild visitation statute in Michigan makes

128. See Annotation, Visitation Rights of Persons Other Than Natural Parents or
Grandparents,I A.L.R. 4th 1270 (1981).
129. § 4-113(c), 9 U.L.A. at 76.
130. See JOHNE.NowAK&RoNALDD. ROTUNDA, CONsTlTUTIONALLAW § 13.4, at 506 (4th
ed. 1991).
131. KAN. CIV. PRoc. CODEANN. § 60-1616 (West Supp. 1996).
132. See CLARK, supra note 91, at 812.
133. § 4-113(b), (cX3), 9 U.L.A. at76.
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this point by stating that "[a] grandparenting time order ... shall not be
considered to have created parental rights in the [grandparent]."' Nor is
there any general presumption that the child's interests are best served by
such associations. 35 Thus, the courts have much wider discretion to deny
third party visitation petitions.
Besides affecting the availability of a visitation order in the first place,
the petitioner's standing as a parent, on the one hand, or a so-called third
party, on the other hand, may also affect the range of remedies available to
enforce such an order. Generally speaking, the legal system will go to
greater lengths over time to protect a child's ongoing relationship with the
noncustodial parent. An in-depth discussion oftwo reported cases involving
the enforcement of court orders regarding visitation with minor children
will serve to illustrate this point. The first case, Ridley v. Ridley, 136 involved
the lengthy dispute between two parents following their divorce. The
parties in the second case, Rhinehartv. Nowlin,137 were the custodial father
of two minor children and his former wife, who had served as stepmother
to the children and had received visitation rights when she and the father
divorced. The father in Ridley undeniably received greater judicial
assistance than the stepmother in Rhinehart with the enforcement of
visitation rights.
The Ridley case was decided by a New Jersey trial court in 1996, eleven
years after the divorce court had initially awarded primary custody of the
three Ridley children (then ages two, six and eight) to the mother and
visitation rights to the father. According to the Ridley court, visitation was
difficult to arrange "[a]lmost from its inception": the father "sought time
and time again to effectively visit with his children and ... through the
years [he] sought the court's aid.' ' 138 Eleven years later, the court clearly
shared the father's sense of frustration because "[t]he court's orders have
been unavailing, as notwithstanding victories in court, visitation has been

134. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.27b(6) (West Supp. 1997). Other statutes express the
limitation on grandparent interests in more specific terms, for example, by stating that the
grandparent's interests are not relevant in the event that the child becomes the subject of an
adoption proceeding. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(2)(BX2Xc) (West 1997). Butsee N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-09-05.1 (1997) ("Joinder of grandparents... awarded visitation rights... must occur
in any proceeding to terminate parental rights.").
135. But see N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1 ("Visitation rights of grandparents to an
unmarried minor are presumed to be in the best interest of the minor.").
136. 675 A.2d 249 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1996), rev'd on other grounds, Ridley v.
Dennison, 675 A.2d 249 (N.J. Super. 1997). The appellate court ruled that the trial court's factual
findings were incorrect, but not that the state law regulating visitation was incorrectly articulated
or applied.
137. 805 P.2d 88 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990).
138. Ridley, 675 A.2d at 250.
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effectively denied."' 39 Indeed, at the time of the Ridley case in 1996, the
father had not seen his children for approximately eight years. The court
placed responsibility for this situation directly on the shoulders of the
custodial mother. Although the children had testified about their own
negative feelings for the father and their desire not to see him, the court
concluded that "it is [the mother] who has, by overt and covert means,
influenced the children, resulting in the present estrangement between
plaintiff and his three children."' 40 In the most recent litigation prior to the
1996 Ridley case, the court had approved an agreement between the parties
involving increased child support payments from the father, and also
ordered the mother to send the children to Germany for three weeks to visit
with their father who had a military posting there. The visit did not occur,
and the father returned to court one more time.
In Ridley, the father first sought an order that would terminate his child
support obligation as each child reached age eighteen. (His oldest child,
whom he was still supporting, was already nineteen years old, while the
other two were ages thirteen and seventeen.) In addition, he sought
enforcement of the earlier three-week visitation order, and the imposition
of sanctions against the mother for her willful past failure to comply with
it. As to child support, the court recited the state's strong public policy on
this subject, and refused to limit the father's responsibility. Regarding
visitation, the court stressed the public policy that favors and enforces
contact between children and both of their parents, as well as the interest
of the court in "demonstrat[ing] that recalcitrant behavior [by persons
subject to visitation orders] will not be tolerated."'' The court held the
custodial mother in contempt of court, and formulated a number of
remedies for the father.
First, the court ordered the mother to pay in excess of six thousand
dollars to the father, which represented his counsel fees and court costs for
the present litigation, as well as punitive damages "result[ing] from the
mother's] willful violation of [the father's] rights."' 42 Second, as
preparation for the children's three-week visit to Germany, the court
ordered the mother to supervise weekly phone calls and letters between the
children and their father, beginning immediately. The level of detail in the
court's order is striking; for example, the court required the children to
respond in their letters to each point raised by the father in his letter from
the prior week. Finally, the court appointed a guardian ad litem for the
children, setting forth the steps this individual should take to expedite the
visit to Germany. The guardian was authorized to interview the recalcitrant
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id.
Id. at251.
Id.
Id. at 253.
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mother and the children, and to communicate with the children's therapist
to obtain helpful information. The guardian was required to oversee the
letter-writing and telephoning requirements, bill the mother monthly for
expenses, and submit a written report to the court every three months about
the status of the case. The court stated more than once that the mother's
future failure to comply with all of its present orders or to cooperate with
the guardian could
result in the imposition of additional sanctions, including
14 3
incarceration.
Ridley is a striking example of a long-running visitation enforcement
case. It illustrates the practical difficulty of actually bringing visitation about
through a court order when the custodial parent is stubbornly
uncooperative. It stands for the proposition that courts will not give up, in
the face of such difficulty, when the visiting adult is a legal parent. Finally,
the case illustrates the lengths to which courts are willing to go, in terms of
micro-managing the affairs of the custodial family, to vindicate the interest
of the court system in having its orders respected.
Like Ridley, Rhinehart v. Nolin involved a custodial parent, here the
father, who willfully flaunted the divorce court's order regarding visitation
for his former spouse, the children's stepmother. In Rhinehart,the divorce
decree incorporated the agreement ofthe parties regarding the stepmother's
future visitation with the children, including provisions for counseling and
mediation to facilitate such continuing contact. The children, who were
very young at the time of their father's marriage, were six and seven years
old at the time of the divorce. More than two years later, the parties
returned to court, where the trial court held the father in contempt, based
on his pattern of noncompliance with the visitation order. 144 The monetary
sanctions imposed on the father at that time, payable to the stepmother,
totaled more than twenty-six thousand dollars and represented attorney's
fees, costs, and punitive damages. At the same time, however, the court
rescinded the visitation order, ruling that this result best served the interests
ofthe children. All ofthese rulings were affirmed by theNewMexico Court
of Appeals in the Rhinehartcase.
According to the trial court, it was clearly in the children's interests to
continue to see their stepmother with whom they had a significant
relationship, but "because of the extreme hostility and animosity between
the parties, it [was] not in the children's best interests to continue

143. The Ridley court denied the father's request for incarceration of the mother because the
court believed that such a measure would be punitive rather than coercive under the circumstances
existing at that time. See id. at 252. Incarceration clearly remained one of the "additional
sanctions" alluded to by the court that remained available in the event of continuing
noncompliance. See id. at 253.
144. See Rhinehart,805 P.2d at 90.
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court-mandatedvisitation.'1 45 On appeal the Phinehartcourt accepted the
trial court's finding that the "father was primarily responsible for the level
of conflict," as well as the decision to restrict sanctions against the father
to monetary damages. 146 In other words, the Rhinehart court did not
require any future-oriented sanctions to vindicate the stepmother's interests
or those of the court in having its orders performed.
While there are numerous factual differences between the Ridley and
Rhinehartcases, a key difference involves the status of the adult claiming
visitation rights-a noncustodial father in Ridley, and a noncustodial
stepmother in Rhinehart. The stepmother in Rhinehart, who was not a
biological or adoptive parent, simply did not enjoy the status of "legal
parent," and suffered from her categorization as a third-party claimant. This
crucial legal distinction was carried over into the discussion of the
children's best interests in each case. In Ridley, even after eight years of
separation and a lack of desire for renewed contact on the part of the
children, the trial court had no doubt that judicially coerced visitation with
the father would best serve the children's interests. By way of contrast, the
stepmother in Rhinehart lost the court's support for her claims as soon as
enforcement became a problem, because there was no similar assumption
about the strength and importance of children's ties with adults other than
their parents.
The interests threatened by noncompliance with a judicial visitation
order are not just the private interests of the child and the visiting adult, but
also the public interest in respect for the legal system. If the parties to
whom court orders are addressed can elect not to obey them, then the
power of the courts is obviously diminished. In both Ridley and Rhinehart,
the integrity of the court system was threatened by a custodial parent
unwilling to comply with a reasonable visitation order,'47 but only the
Ridley court expressed concern about this matter. Apparently, the
Rhinehart court felt that less was at stake for the judicial system because
the private interests it was protecting in the initial visitation order were less
weighty.
The crucial task, then, as lawmakers anticipate the enforcement of
visitation rights for former parents under section 4-113 of the UAA, is to
specify the nature of these rights and the status of the former parent in the
eyes of the law. As discussed earlier in this Part, the UAA clearly
terminates the legal parental status and relegates the former parent to the
category of "third parties" who may seek judicial help in realizing their
145. Id. at 92 (emphasis added).
146. Id.
147. See also Glesnerv. Dembrosky, 327 S.E.2d 60,63 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) ("The integrity
of the court system and its judgments demands that parties may not cease compliance with
judgments at whatever times they may see fit.").
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rights of access to children outside their custody.'48 Still, lawmakers could
choose to define the newly-created rights and status offormer parents more
expansively than the rights of other third parties, such as the stepmother in
the Rhinehart case.
Thus, an argument can be made that greater protection for this new
category of third-party claimants would be appropriate, based on the
essential nature and de facto possibilities of the former parent's relationship
with his or her child. First, biological relationships undeniably play a major
role in defining the nature of adult claims to the custody or partial custody
of children in various legal contexts. Traditionally, adoption law has
eliminated the issue of biological relationships in the post-adoption setting
by requiring that the birth parent be totally eliminated from the legal
picture.' 49 The visitation provision of section 4-113 reopens the door to the
former noncustodial parent, who remains biologically related to the child,
to make a biology-based argument in the post-adoption visitation
context."'
Beyond biological considerations, the former noncustodial parent may
be a likely candidate for more meaningful protection than other third parties
because he or she served the role of legal (as well as biological) parent from
the time ofthe child's birth until the child's adoption by the stepparent. This
legal relationship distinguishes the former parent from other third parties
who may seek the enforcement of visitation orders in other settings, such
as grandparents who obtained visitation rights with minor grandchildren
following the divorce of their child, or the stepmother who obtained
visitation rights with her minor stepchildren following the divorce from
their father in the Rhinehartcase. Furthermore, many adopted stepchildren
and their noncustodial parents will have resided together in the past in a
traditional nuclear familywhen the noncustodial parent and custodial parent
were married to each other, prior to the formation of the stepfamily. If
these biological, legal, and de facto ties between parent and child were
meaningful to the parties in the past, then a higher level of future legal
protection may be appropriate for the parent who receives a visitation order
as a former parent following stepparent adoption.'

148. See supranote 123 and accompanying text.
149. See, e.g., § 1-105, 9 U.L.A. at 8.
150. This consideration has no relevance in cases where the parental status of the former
noncustodial parent had been established by adoption rather than birth.
151. Ironically, the fact that the ties between the adopted child and the stepparent may be
more compelling than the child's ties with other third parties, such as grandparents, has been used
to justify the denial of visitation rights to parents. According to this reasoning, the special nature
and degree of involvement by the former parent with the child in the past makes him or her a
greater threat to the autonomy of the adoptive family. See, e.g., Mimkon v. Ford, 332 A.2d 199,

204 (N.J. 1975) (reasoning that grandparent visitation is permitted, inter alia, because the
grandparent poses less of a threat to the authority of the adoptive family than a former parent).
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In practical terms, greater recognition and protection for former parents
in the post-stepparent adoption context would require the enhanced
enforcement of their visitation rights. A wider range of enforcement
sanctions would be placed at the disposal of the courts, and judges would
use these remedies in cases where the stepfamily became unreasonably
uncooperative after the adoption and visitation orders were entered. In
other words, the Ridley case, and similar cases involving the enforcement
of visitation rights for legal parents following divorce, would provide the
model for former parent claims following stepparent adoption.15z
The subject ofjudicial enforcement of post-adoption visitation rights for
the former parent reduces theoretical discussions about autonomy in the
adoptive stepfamily to a very practical level. From the perspective of the
former parent, the question is largely one of remedies; namely, what help
will be available from the courts to insure that the former parent enjoys the
privileges promised in the original adoption order? From the perspective of
the adoptive family, the issue may be framed differently; namely, what
forms will the continuing intrusion of the legal system into the otherwise
autonomous adoptive family take? The UAA provides incomplete answers
to these important questions.

152. Besides the remedies discussed in the text, which involve the judicial enforcement of
visitation orders, private remedies arising under tort and contract law doctrines may also be
considered by persons whose visitation rights have been thwarted. In recent years, a number of
state courts have considered whether a tort cause of action should be recognized when parents
allege unlawful interference with their rights of custody or visitation by the other parent or a third
party. See William L. Hill, Note, TortRecoveryforIntentionalInterferencewith VisitationRights:
A NecessaryAlternative,32 U. LotnsvnJ.FAm.L. 657 (1993-94). Some states have recognized
a cause of action, either under the general doctrine of intentional infliction of emotional distress,
or under a separate tort action for serious interference with custodial or visitation rights. See id.
at 662-71. The injured party may recover compensatory and punitive damages under these
theories, if the interfering conduct of the defendant was extreme or outrageous and the harm
caused by such behavior was severe. See id. at 666-69. Other states, however, have refused to
extend tort theories to protect family relationships in this manner, or have limited their protection
to the primary custodian of children. See Edward B. Borris, TortsArisingOut ofInterferencewith
Custodyand Visitation, 7 DIVORCE LrIG. 192 (1995); Hill, supra at 667. Indeed, even in states
that have protected visitation rights for parents in this manner, an additional extension of tort
doctrine would be required to create a cause of action for third parties such as the former parent
following a stepparent adoption. Thus, tort theories are not a widely available alternative for the
former parent at this time.
Contract law is not likely to be more satisfactory than tort doctrine for this purpose. If the
adoption court's visitation order refers to an agreement between the parties regarding future
visitation for the former parent, he or she may seek to enforce the contract if the adoptive
stepfamily later refuses to comply with the visitation provision. It is not clear whether such a cause
of action would be available under the provisions of the UAA, because the contract may be
deemed to have "merged" into the visitation order. Furthermore, a contract theory would not likely
provide any remedies beyond those available in a proceeding to enforce the court's visitation
order, including specific performance and compensatory damages.
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First, section 4-113 of the UAA states clearly that the post-adoption
visitation order "may be enforced in a civil action ...""' In other words,
the former parent has standing to complain about wrongful interference
with his or her visitation rights by the adoptive family in an appropriate
legal proceeding. Notably, the UAA does not continue the jurisdiction of
the adoption court in the original adoption proceeding for this purpose, so
the complaining former parent must initiate a new lawsuit to seek
enforcement. The alternative approach to custody and visitation orders,
wherein the original decreeing court retains ongoing jurisdiction, is
commonly employed by state courts in post-divorce families.' 54 Professor
Annette Ruth Apell has noted that the handful of state statutes that already
recognize post-adoption visitation are split on this issue, and that the UAA
model imposes a greater burden on the complaining former parent because
it is more burdensome to initiate a new lawsuit than to file a motion to
reopen a pending case.' 55
Next, the former parent who initiates an enforcement action in the
proper court must cross a substantive hurdle before obtaining judicial
assistance under the UAA to enforce a post-adoption visitation order.
Namely, section 4-113(e) provides that the adoption court's order"may be
enforced in a civil action only ifthe court finds that enforcement is in the
best interest of a minor adoptee." 5 Under this standard, the adoptive
family has a clear opportunity to argue that intervention on behalf of the
former parent at the time of the enforcement proceeding would not benefit
the child. If successful, the custodial family could, in effect, lawfully deny
all access to the child in spite of the existence of a proper visitation order.
Indeed, this result was reached in a recent third-party visitation case
involving the enforcement of a visitation order by the grandparent of a child
whose parents were divorced. 7 An appellate court in Florida "suspended"
the visitation order, based on a determination that current enforcement
would not serve the grandchild's best interests in light of the custodial
parent's opposition."'
Ifthe former parent properly files suit and successfully establishes his or
her entitlement to the enforcement of a post-adoption visitation order under
the UAA, the question of remedies remains. The UAA has little to say
about this important topic. Indeed, the only reference to specific remedies
is a negative one: "Failure to comply with the terms of an order... for
visitation or communication is not a ground for revoking, setting aside, or

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

§ 4-113(e), 9 U.L.A. at 76.
See ELROD, supra note 19, § 3:19
See Appell, supra note 33, at 515-16.
§ 4-113(e), 9 U.L.A. at 76 (emphasis added).
See Brago v. Brago, 604 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992).

158. See id. at 866-67.
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otherwise challenging the validity ofa consent, relinquishment, or adoption
pertaining to a minor stepchild."' 59 The threat that an adoption may be
legally set aside if the adoptive family interferes with the child's continuing
relationship with the former parent may appear to be the ultimate coercive
tool to assure compliance with a visitation order. Nevertheless, the UAA
withholds this remedy, out of deference to the important policy of assuring
the finality of adoption orders. In this regard, the UAA is consistent with
many of the state statutes that already authorize post-adoption visitation
orders, which similarly provide that final adoption orders cannot be set
aside because of problems with the performance of a post-adoption
visitation agreement or order."6
In the absence of a comprehensive statutory scheme that authorizes
enforceable post-adoption visitation orders, such as the UAA's stepparent
adoption article, a number of state courts have set aside final adoption
decrees following the breakdown of informal visitation arrangements
between the adoptive stepfamily and the former noncustodial parent.' In
each of these cases, the noncustodial parent consented to his or her child's
adoption by a stepparent in exchange for the adoptive family's promise to
permit continuing visitation. Subsequently, the parties returned to court
when the plan for visitation failed. In the absence of any legal authority to
grant or regulate visitation in the post-adoptive family, most judges have
identified just two avenues for their decisionmaking: either to nullify the
parties' understanding regarding visitation, or to set aside the adoption on
the ground that no true "unconditional" parental consent had been given.
In several cases, the courts decided to set aside the adoption, thereby
protecting the expectations ofthe complaining former parent at the expense
of the important principle of finality in the adoption process. The UAA, of
course, authorizes the adoption court to formally approve the promise of
the adoptive family regarding visitation at the time of adoption, and
contemplates the subsequent judicial enforcement of the promise through
methods other than setting aside the adoption. 62
Aside from its disavowal ofthe adoption set-aside remedy, however, the
UAA is silent on the subject of specific enforcement remedies, leaving this
important matter to the law of each enacting state on the subject. To date,
the state statutes providing for post-adoption visitation by former parents
that are not modeled on the UAA have similarly failed to address the

159. § 4-113(g), 9 U.L.A. at 76.
160. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 8714.7(eX1) (West Supp. 1998); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-19-16-8
(Michie 1997); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-164 (1993 & Supp. 1996); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-35(D)
(Michie 1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.305(3) (1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.33.295(3)
(West 1997); W. VA. CODE § 48-4-12(e) (1997).
161. See MAHONEY, supranote 29, at 188 n.77 (collecting cases).
162. See § 4-113(b), (c), (g), 9 U.L.A. at 76.
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subject of remedies in any comprehensive fashion. 63 In states contemplating
enactment of the UAA, the legislatures and courts will have to fill in the
blanks in section 4-113 and decide how forcefully and with what sanctions
the newly-created right of visitation for former parents will be enforced.
In this process, the existing body of state laws that provide for the
enforcement of visitation orders in other settings,1IC such as the New Jersey
and New Mexico laws applied in the Ridley 6" and Rhinehart'66 cases,
respectively, provide an important point ofreference. As discussed in detail
earlier, the range of sanctions employed against the uncooperative custodial
parents in these two cases included the finding of contempt for breach of
the visitation order, the threat of incarceration, the award of compensatory
and punitive damages, and the appointment of a guardian whose
responsibilities were almost certain to become intrusive in the ongoing
affairs of the custodial family.167
An even more comprehensive list of enforcement sanctions appears in
a Utah statute, which provides numerous remedies, primarily for
noncustodial parents who experience unlawful interference with their
visitation rights. 68 First, the custodial parent may be held in contempt of
court and enjoined from further noncompliance with the visitation order.
The parent may be incarcerated until he or she indicates a willingness to
cooperate. The parent may also be required to pay a fine to the court, or

163. Several of the state post-adoption visitation laws, like the UAA, are silent on the subject
of affirmative remedies for enforcing post-adoption visitation orders. See ALASKA STAT. §
25.23.230 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1997); CAL. FAM. CODE § 8714.7 (West 1998); NFV. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 125A.330, 127.171 (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-35(E)
(Michie 1995); N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 383-c (Mckinney 1992 & Supp. 1997); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 25-6-17 (Michie Supp. 1997); W. VA. CODE § 48-4-12 (1997). The others mention the
following specific remedies: IND. CODE ANN. § 31-19-16-4 to 5 (Michie 1997) (providing that
court may "compel" performance, but may not award damages); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-165 (1993
& Supp. 1996) (authorizing award of attorney's fees); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.305(4Xa) (1997)
(requiring mediation before any visitation enforcement action can be filed); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 26.33.295(4) (West 1997) (authorizing award of attorney's fees); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§
48.925(4), 785.04(lXa) (West 1997) (authorizing order of contempt, and limiting sanctions to
monetary fines and damage awards). With the possible exception of the Wisconsin statute, it
appears that none of these statutes is intended to be a comprehensive treatment of the subject of
enforcement of post-adoption visitation orders.
164. See generally I DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIEs § 2.8(1), (2) (2d ed. 1993)
(cataloging the methods available to the courts to enforce equitable decrees).
165. See Ridley, 675 A.2d 249.
166. See Rhinehart,835 P.2d 88.
167. See supratext accompanying notes 142-43 & 145.
168. See UTAH CODEANN. § 78-32-12.2 (1996). This provision was to be "implemented only
as a pilot program" for a short period of time in a limited area of the state. See id. § 78-3312.2(14). The provision applies to certain third parties as well as parents who enjoy court-ordered
visitation rights. See id. § 78-32-12.2(lXb).
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reimburse the other party's litigation costs. 69 The court may order
"make-up visits" to compensate for missed visits in the past. The
uncooperative parent may be ordered to perform community service, or to
participate in counseling sessions that teach the value of family
relationships. The court may order mediation between the parties designed
to resolve their differences. Finally, the family court may refer the case to
the criminal law system for possible prosecution of the custodial parent for
the crime of interference with the relationship between noncustodial parent
and child. Each of the sanctions listed in this comprehensive Utah statute
may be invoked in the court's discretion to protect the relationship between
the noncustodial parent and his or her child.
Now that every state has enacted legislation authorizing courts to enter
grandparent visitation orders, many of these statutes also address the
question of enforcement. Some contain an open-ended statement that the
court may issue whatever additional orders are necessary to enforce the
initial grandparent visitation order.' Others list one or more specific
remedies available to aid the grandparent who establishes wrongful
7
interference with grandchild visitation, including a finding of contempt,1 '
make-up visits, 172 the posting of a bond, 73 the payment of court costs and
attorney's fees, 74 and mandatory mediation and/or arbitration.' 7 Like the
lengthy list of sanctions for disappointed visiting parents provided in the
Utah statute, the remedies outlined in these grandparent visitation statutes
should be applied in individual cases only if ajudge considers such a result
to be appropriate.
As lawmakers address the issue of enforcement of post-adoption

169. In otherjurisdictions, the court may also order the uncooperative custodial parent to pay

damages to the other parent whose visitation rights have been violated. See, e.g., WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 26.09.160(2)(bXiii) ("Upon a finding of contempt, the court shall order... [t]he
parent to pay, to the moving party, a civil penalty, not less than the sum of one hundred dollars.").
170. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(2XbX2Xc) (West Supp. 1998); HAw. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 571-46.3 (Michie 1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-9-3(A) (Michie 1994 & Supp. 1998); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 1014 (1989).

171. See COLO.

REv. STAT.

§ 19-1-117.5(2Xe) (Supp. 1997); OHIo REv.

CODE ANN.

§

3109.051(k) (Anderson 1996 & Supp. 1997).
172. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-1-117.5(2Xd); Ofno REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.051(K).
173. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-1-117.5(2Xc).
174. See CoLo. REv. STAT. § 19-1-117.5(2Xf); OmoREv. CODE ANN. § 3109.051(K); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1014; W. VA. CODE § 48-23-8 (1996). But see Glesner v. Dembrosky, 327
S.E.2d 60,63 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (disallowing reimbursement ofgrandparents' litigation-related
travel expenses because "[a] North Carolina court has no authority to award damages to a private

party in a contempt proceeding").
175. See COLO.REv. STAT. § 19-1-117.5(lXc);N.D.

CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1 (Supp. 1995).
But see In re Robert D., 198 Cal. Rptr. 801, 805 (Cal. Ct App. 1984) (setting aside trial court

order of mandatory counseling for grandparents and adoptive stepfamily in the absence of
legislation authorizing such a remedy to enforce the grandparents' visitation rights).
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visitation orders for former parents in states that enact section 4-113 ofthe
UAA, they may profitably refer to the extensive lists of remedies that
appear in the Ridley and Rhinehart opinions, 76 the Utah visitation
statute, 177 and the various state grandparent visitation statutes described
above.' As a practical matter, each of the specific sanctions could be
extended to the newly-created enforcement setting of the post-adoptive
stepfamily, if such an extension seemed appropriate to state lawmakers.
There is an additional set of enforcement remedies available under the
laws of many states in parent versus parent visitation disputes that would
not find such easy application in the post-adoptive stepfamily. These
additional measures involve the judicial modification of outstanding court
orders governing custody, child support, and alimony, usually in the postdivorce family. For example, if the custodial parent fails over time to
comply with a visitation order, the family court may determine that a
change of primary custody would best serve the child's interests.179 Besides
the terms of custody and visitation orders, many separated or divorced
parents of minor children are also bound by the economic terms of a
separation agreement or court order relating to child support and possibly
spousal support (ifthe parents had been married to each other). The court's
continuing power to adjust the parties' economic affairs may be used as
another sanction against the custodial parent who interferes with visitation.
Thus, the court may suspend alimony payments to the custodial parent for
time periods when he or she denies the other parent's access to the child.18
A related and controversial tool for enforcing visitation involves the
suspension ofchild support payable by the noncustodial parent.' There are
obvious financial and other costs to family members associated with these

176. See supratext accompanying notes 142-43 & 145.

177. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-32-12.2.
178. See supranotes 170-75.
179. See, e.g., KAN. CIV. PROC. CODE ANN. § 60-1616(e) (West Supp. 1996) ("Repeated
unreasonable denial of or interference with visitation rights granted to a parent... may be
considered a material change of circumstances which justifies modification of a prior order of
child custody."); Edward B. Borris, Interferencewith ParentalRights ofNoncustodialParentas
GroundsforModification ofChild Custody, 8 DIVORCE LrMG. 1 (1997) (surveying case law and
concluding that the majority rule nationwide does permit a change in primary custody in

appropriate cases).
180. See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 241 (McKinney 1986) ("When it appears to the
satisfaction of the court that a custodial parent receiving alimony or maintenance . . . has
wrongfully interfered with or withheld visitation rights. . . ,the court, in its discretion, may
suspend such payments or cancel any arrears that may have accrued during the time that visitation
rights have been or are being interfered with or withheld."). But see VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §

668a(b) (Supp. 1997) ("When a custodial parent refuses to honor a noncustodial parent's
visitation rights, the noncustodial parent shall not fail to pay any ordered... alimony.").
181. See Greg Geisman, Strengtheningthe Weak Link in the Family Law Chain: Child
Support and Visitation as Complementary Activities, 38 S.D. L. REv. 568 (1992-93).
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types of remedies. Nevertheless, they remain available in certain cases to
guarantee the meaningful contact between the child and both parents
anticipated in the original custody and visitation decrees.
Clearly, this set of remedies is unavailable in visitation cases involving
a nonparent. There can be no economic sanction comparable to the
suspension ofchild support or alimony payments because third parties, such
as grandparents or the former parent following a stepparent adoption, do
not generally owe any economic support to the child or the custodial parent
in the first place. Similarly, grandparents and other third parties who do not
reside with the minor child generally lack standing to seek primary custody,
thereby eliminating any threat of shifting custody to the nonparent as a
remedy for the custodial parent's interference with visitation rights.18 2 The
same standing limitation applies to the former parent whose parental rights
have been terminated in the stepparent adoption setting, who has no
ongoing custodial interest beyond that provided in the post-adoption
visitation order. Thus, the custody, alimony, and child support related
sanctions, which may be invoked in parent versus parent disputes, simply
have no practical relevance in third-party visitation cases.
A final visitation enforcement sanction, which is widely available in
parent versus parent cases, is rarely discussed in third-party visitation cases
although it could, as a practical matter, be extended to them. The laws in
most jurisdictions currently authorize the family courts in appropriate
circumstances to enjoin a proposed relocation by the custodial parent and
child in order to protect the existing relationship between the noncustodial
parent and child.'
As a general rule, the courts considering the
noncustodial parent's request for such an injunction apply a legal standard
weighing the competing interests that inevitably arise when the custodial
parent seeks to move with the child to a distant location.8 4 On the one
hand, the custodial parent heads a family entitled to privacy and autonomy,
including the freedom to travel to a new home. On the other hand, the child
has an interest in stability, especially in maintaining his or her established
relationship with the noncustodial parent, who also has a protectable
interest in their relationship. Given the mobile nature ofmodern society, the
relocation issue has arisen with frequency between divorced parents in
recent years, and the state courts have struggled to establish fair standards

182. Cf Truitt v. Truitt, 583 N.E.2d 331 (Ohio CL App. 1989) (overturning placement of
children with the county department of children's services based on custodial mother's failure to
cooperate with grandparent visitation).
183. See Carol S. Bruch & JanetM. Bowermaster, The Relocation ofChildrenand Custodial
Parents:Public Policy,PastandPresent,30 FAM. L. Q. 245 (1996).
184. Id. at 250 (summarizing current state of the law and approving "national trend ...
which
restores a custodial parent's relocation opportunities).
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to resolve these disputes.'85
To date, this form of protection has not been widely extended to
grandparents or other third-party visitation claimants. Indeed, several
grandparent visitation statutes expressly withhold such injunctive relief
when the custodial parent relocates with the minor grandchild. 8 6 In other
words, the custodial parent and child are free to move to a distant location
in spite of the impact of this change on the grandparents' rights under an
existing visitation order.
The relocation issue provides a focal point for evaluating the status of
the former parent who is granted visitation rights following a stepparent
adoption under section 4-113. On the one hand, the complaint ofthe former
parent could be automatically dismissed, as are the complaints of most
grandparents with visitation orders, when the custodial parent decides to
relocate with the child.'8 7 This firm rule would assign clear priority to the
value of autonomy in the adoptive stepfamily, and consistently disallow any
interference by third parties with important decisions about family domicile.
On the other hand, the relationship between the adopted stepchild and the
former parent may be regarded as deserving ofgreater protection. Although
the former parent no longer has a protectable interest in the constitutional
scheme of things, the child's interests arguably may require some brake on
adoptive family autonomy in order to preserve the unique relationship with
the other biological parent in appropriate cases. If this latter view prevailed,
then discretion might properly be conferred on the courts to decide on a
case-by-case basis whether to enjoin a proposed move by the adoptive
stepfamily.
The UAA is silent on the subject of relocation by the adoptive
stepfamily, as well as most other issues relating to the enforcement of postadoption visitation orders. Jurisdictions that enact section 4-113 of the
UAA will have to determine, without guidance from the model act,

185. See id.
186. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-1-117(3) (Supp. 1998); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(2)(bX2Xc)
(West Supp. 1998); MIcH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 722.27b(5) (West Supp. 1998); cf N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 40-9-4 (Michie Supp. 1998) (requiring custodial parent merely to notify grandparent of
proposed move and provide new address and phone number); compareFisher v. Fisher, 390 So.
2d 142 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (denying injunction by reference to Florida statute) with Dixon v.
Melton, 565 So. 2d 1378, 1381 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (enjoining removal of child from the
jurisdiction by custodial mother, because "injunction was not entered 'solely' for the purpose of
permitting the... [paternal grandparents] to visit with the child."); see also Patricia Wendlandt,
Comment, GrandparentVisitation Statutes: Remaining Problemsand the Needfor Uniformity,
67MARQ. L. REv. 730,747-49 (1984) (arguing against any grandparent right to enjoin relocation
by custodial parent and child). But see CAL. FAm. CODE § 3103(f) (West 1994) (providing that
grandparent visitation order is a factor for the court to consider in deciding whether to permit
relocation by the custodial parent and child).
187. See, e.g., Fisher, 390 So.2d at 1381.
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precisely what enforcement remedies will be placed at the discretion of the
courts that are empowered to enforce visitation orders. Furthermore, basic
decisions will have to be made about the readiness with which the courts
should invoke the available remedies on behalf of former parents in
individual cases. In making these policy judgments, state legislators and
judges will be greatly influenced by their view of the nature of the
newly-created status of the former parent under the UAA. As illustrated
throughout this Part, the various questions surrounding the implementation
and enforcement of visitation orders for former parents can be properly
resolved only after this threshold assessment has been made.
Finally, the extended discussion in this Part about the enforcement of
post-adoption visitation rights for former parents has, by definition, focused
on the possibility of noncompliance with visitation orders by the custodial
family in stepparent adoption cases. Enforcement problems, however, are
likely to be the exception and not the rule. Most family members are
law-abiding individuals, who do their best to comply with any judicial
orders that regulate their family matters. In most cases, the underlying
policy considerations on which visitation rights are based can be
implemented simply through the entry of a judicial order, especially if the
open adoption was agreed to by all of the parties. Indeed, studies of open
adoption (largely in the informal, nonstatutory context) indicate that
compliance rates are quite high. 8 ' Furthermore, any problems that arise
over time are more likely to be resolved by future agreement if mediation
and counseling services are made available to the family. When private
efforts to effectuate compliance with a visitation order fail, however,
section 4-113 clearly provides for the judicial enforcement of the adoption
court's order."8 9
VI. CONCLUSION

In summary, section 4-113 of the Uniform Adoption Act is a wellconceived effort to create a more flexible stepparent adoption law which
addresses the needs of an important category ofnontraditional families. The
post-adoption visitation provision for former parents recognizes that the
traditional adoption model simply does not "fit" the situations of many
stepchildren and their families. Section 4-113 provides guidance to courts
confronted with adoption and visitation petitions by highlighting the factors,
including the presence of an agreement between the parties, that should
properly guide judicial decisionmaking about the best interests of the child.

188. See Jeanne Etter, Levels of Cooperationand Satisfaction in 56 Open Adoptions, 72
261 (1993) (reporting that 98% offamilies studied compliedwiththe terms

CHILDWELFARE257,

of mediated open adoption contracts).
189. See § 4-113(e), 9 U.L.A. at 76.
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The added burdens imposed on the courts by section 4-113 to make
determinations about visitation in the adoption proceeding and enforcement
of the visitation order thereafter, are justified by the important benefits of
the post-adoption visitation provision of the UAA.
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